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Due to the fact that some international agreements are primarily
national in character, their benefits are not "felt" directly by any
particular citizen, but rather by the public in general. This is the case
with treaties of peace and extradition. Other agreements, although ben-
eficial to the nation as a whole, operate primarily through individuals,
who serve as their direct beneficiaries. A prisoner transfer treaty is an
unequal mixture of the two, with the individual benefit component far
outweighing the public benefit component.
The United States Senate report accompanying the implementing
legislation proclaimed that "this transfer of prisoners is a part of Amer-
ican concern about human rights, because it provides an opportunity
to improve the status of the prisoners who come under it.'
Since the society into which the offender is to be transferred is
most probably the society in which he will later reside and into which
he must be reintegrated, it would seem that the enforcing state has the
greatest interest in the rehabilitation of the offender. Accordingly, the
law of that state regarding the conduct and quality of the imprisonment,
parole, and probation should be applied.
In general terms, the concern for the transferee is a humanitarian
concern. It is the concern that he has choice, to some extent, as to
where and in what sort of prison environment he serves his sentence.
It is also the concern that the inmate can be given an opportunity to
rehabilitate himself in an environment which he assumes is more con-
ducive to such a goal. It is true, however, that the choice to be transferred
is not entirely in the inmate's hands. This choice requires the approval
of both the sentencing and enforcing states, as well as that of the
province (state) to which the inmate is transferring, if he is going to a
provincial (state) institution.
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This study is aimed at discussing human rights issues arising in the
context of a prisoner transfer scheme, that is, to examine to what extent
the substantive and formal conditions imposed upon this form of in-
ternational cooperation in criminal matters are consistent with human-
itarian and rehabilitative goals of the transfer. Undoubtedly, the prisoner's
consent is of paramount importance. And yet some other issues must
not be overlooked, such as the scope of persons eligible for transfer.
The question arises as to whether an offender may request his transfer
to the country of his domicile (residence) or rather to the state of his
citizenship. Furthermore, the procedure of transfer should not be viewed
in merely technical terms as another way of rendition of fugitives.
Instead, these proceedings will be analyzed in the light of a plea for
procedural safeguards that ought to be granted to the transferee. Finally,
some effects of transfer of vital significance to the offender also will
be discussed.
The comparative analysis referred to in this study is based on both
international instruments of prisoner transfer and the domestic legislation
of several countries.2 The set of the former instruments includes all
multilateral conventions to that effect,3 the parallel legislation among
the Nordic countries, 4 and the vast majority of bilateral treaties, notably
2. See the following countries: Austria-Federal Law on Extradition and Legal
Assistance in Criminal Matters, Dec. 4, 1978, BOBI No. 529/1979 [hereinafter ARHG];
Canada-Transfer of Offenders Act 1978; France-Code of Criminal Procedure, Article
713(l) to (8), as amended by Law of 1984; Germany-Law on International Legal As-
sistance in Criminal Matters, Dec. 23, 1982, BGBI I No. 57/1982 [hereinafter IRGI; The
Netherlands-Law on the Transfer of Enforcement of Criminal Judgments, Sept. 10, 1986,
Staatsblad No. 464/1986; Rumania-Code of Criminal Procedie, Articles 519 to 521;
Switzerland-Law on International Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, Mar. 20, 1981,
Sammiung Eidgenbssischer Gesetze 1982, p. 846; Turkey-Law No. 3002, May 8, 1984;
United Kingdom-Repatriation of Prisoners Act 1984; United States-18 U.S.C. §§ 4100-
4115 (1976).
3. See the Riyadh Arab Agreement on Judicial Cooperation of Apr. 6, 1983 [here-
inafter the Arab Convention]; the Convention on the Transfer of Persons Sentenced to
Imprisonment to Their Home Countries to Serve Their Sentence of May 19, 1978 [here-
inafter the Berlin Convention]; the European Convention on the International Validity of
Criminal Judgments of 1970, E.T.S. No. 70 [hereinafter the 1970 European Convention];
the Council of Europe Convention on the Transfer of Sentence4 Persons of 1983, E.T.S.
No. 112 [hereinafter the Council of Europe Convention]; the Benelux Convention on the
Enforcement of Judicial Judgments in Criminal Matters of 1968 [hereinafter the Benelux
Convention]; the Commonwealth Scheme for the Transfer of Convicted Offenders of 1986
[hereinafter the Commonwealth Scheme].
4. See the following laws enacted in the Nordic countries: Denmark-Law No. 214,
May 3, 1963; Finland-Law No. 326, June 20, 1963; Iceland-Law No. 69, Dec. 12,
1963; Norway-Law of Nov. 15, 1963; Sweden-Law No. '193, May 22, 1963 (SFS
1963:193).
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those concluded by the United States,' Canada, 6 Thailand, 7 Greece,'
France with African countries,9 Poland with developing countries, 0 Spain
with Latin American states," as well as those between Eastern European
and Western countries. 2 Two draft agreements are also taken into
consideration."
II. SCOPE OF PERSONS ELIGIBLE FOR TRANSFER
The purpose of a transfer scheme is to enable prisoners to be returned
to the country with which they have genuine ties-whether ties of na-
tionality or of long residence strengthened by family or social ties.
Determining which prisoners should be entitled to be repatriated with
S. See the United States prisoner transfer treaties concluded with the following
countries: Mexico-Nov. 25, 1976, T.I.A.S. No. 8718; Canada-Mar. 2, 1977, T.I.A.S.
No. 9552; Bolivia-Feb. 10, 1978, T.I.A.S. No. 9219; Peru-July 6, 1979, T.I.A.S. No.
9784; Panama-Jan. 11, 1979, T.I.A.S. No. 9787; Turkey-June 7, 1979, T.I.A.S. No.
9892; Thailand-Sen. Treaty Doc. No. 98-8, 98th Cong., 1st Sess 1 (1983); France-Jan.
25, 1983, T.I.A.S. No. 10823.
6. See the Canadian prisoner transfer treaties concluded with the following countries:
United States-Mar. 2, 1977, T.S. 1978, No. 12; Mexico-Nov. 22, 1977, T.S. 1979, No.
3; France-Feb. 9, 1979; Bolivia-Mar. 6, 1980, T.S. 1985, No. 4; Peru-Apr. 22, 1980,
T.S. 1980, No. 15; Thailand-Jan. 5, 1983.
7. See the Thai treaties concluded with the following countries: United States-Oct.
29, 1982; Canada-Jan. 5, 1983; France-Mar. 26, 1983; Spain-Dec. 7, 1983; Italy-
Feb. 28, 1984; Portugal-Apr. 1, 1985; Sweden-Sept. 26, 1989; the United Kingdom-
Jan. 22, 1990.
8. See the Greek-Egyptian treaty of Dec. 22, 1986, Journal of Laws (Greece), 1988,
No. 58.
9. See the French treaties concluded with the following African countries: Mauri-
tania-Journal Officiel [hereinafter J.O.1 1962, at 1330; Ivory Coast-J.O. 1962, at 1299;
Upper Volta-J.O. 1962, at 1311; Niger-J.O. 1962, at 1299; Mali-J.O. 1964, at 6129;
Togo-J.O. 1964, at 4990; Gabon-J.O. 1965, at 1724; Central Africa-J.O. 1967, at
4916; Madagascar-J.O. 1975, at 7712; Cameroon-J.O. 1975, at 12903; Senegal-J.O.
1976, at 6260; Benin-J.O. 1978, at 261; Chad-J.O. 1978, at 1925; Congo-J.O. 1982,
at 516; Morocco-J.O. 1986, at 650; Djibouti-September 27, 1986.
10. See the Polish treaties with the following countries: Iraq-Dziennik Ustaw, Journal
of Law, [hereinafter Dz.U.] 1989, No. 70; Syria-Dz.U. 1986, No. 37; Libya-Dz.U.
1987, No. 13; North Korea-Dz.U. 1987, No. 24.
11. See the Spanish treaties with Argentina-BOCG III(C) 1980, No. 178; Mexico-
BOCG III(C) 1987, No. 160; and Peru-BOE 1986, No. 186.
12. See the Polish treaties with Austria-Apr. 19, 1990, and Turkey-Jan. 9, 1989;
the Hungarian treaties with Austria-May 6, 1985, Portugal-Oct. 21, 1988, Spain-Sept.
28, 1987, and Turkey-Sept. 5, 1986; and the Yugoslav treaties with Austria-Feb. 1,
1982, and Turkey-June 22, 1989.
13. See the Model Convention on Expatriation of Accused Persons for Trial and
Sentence and Repatriation for Enforcement of Sentence, elaborated by the ILA Inter-
national Criminal Law Committee; see The International Law Association, Report of the
Sixtieth Conference, Montreal 1982, 377ff. See also the United Nations Model Agreement
on the Transfer of Foreign Offenders, A/CONF. 121/22, 57-60.
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a given country by reason of their connection with it is a matter which
at first looks deceptively simple. On closer inspection the determination
is complicated by the special features of domestic nationality and im-
migration law in the various countries as reflected in international treaties
and implementing legislation.
A review of international instruments of prisoner transfer reveals
the four tests used in them to define the scope of persons eligible for
transfer:
(1) nationality test;
(2) limited nationality test;
(3) hybrid (nationality or domicile) test; and
(4) domicile (residence) test.
However, only the first two tests are of great significance in treaty
practice.
Two multilateral conventions adopt the nationality test without plac-
ing any restrictions on it, i.e., the 1983 Council of Europe Convention
in Article 3(l)(a) and the Arab Convention in Article 58. The nationality
test is adopted in at least thirty-eight of the more than fifty bilateral
treaties under review, i.e., seventy-six percent. However, if we take into
account another eleven treaties, in which the limited nationality test is
applied, we can conclude that all but one treaty bases the criterion of
a prisoner's eligibility for transfer on his nationality, even though the
scope of its application varies. It may be said, therefore, that a prisoner's
nationality of a country to which he is to be transferred has become
the standard criterion in prisoner transfer schemes.
Unlike the nationality test in its basic and most common form, the
domicile (or residence) test underlies the significance of substantive and
meritorious qualifications based on a prisoner's social, family, and pro-
fessional ties with the enforcing state. These considerations, as well as
a prisoner's roots in a country, which are established through longer
residence therein, rather than his nationality, should be decisive in de-
termining the country in which he should serve his sentence. Since the
fundamental objectives of the transfer of sentenced persons are to ease
prison tensions and the problems experienced by foreigners and to con-
tribute to a prisoner's social rehabilitation, it is the most familiar and
closest environment for serving a sentence that should be sought rather
than the state which issued the prisoner's passport.
The rationale behind prisoner transfer implies that not only foreign
prisoners are eligible for outward transfer, and nationals of the enforcing
state are eligible for inward transfer, but also a sentencing country's
own citizens may have valid reasons to request their transfer to another
country. Therefore, I do not share the opinion that a substantial ar-
gument can be made to the effect that a national or resident of the
sentencing state should not be eligible under a prisoner transfer treaty
1046 [Vol. 53
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to serve his sentence in a foreign country.' 4 It is not convincing that
diplomatic problems would arise from such transfer.
In addition, the frequent, albeit far from universal, practice of
refusing to surrender a country's own nationals for extradition cannot
be considered among the possible limitations of a prisoner transfer treaty.
Penal transfer obviously addresses, in the majority of cases, enforcement
by the prisoner's native country. Since the practice of non-extradition
of nationals is usually justified in terms of distrust of the criminal justice
systems of other states, non-enforcement for nationals would be clearly,
an undesirable limitation to place on such a treaty and, in fact, would
render it virtually useless.
It should be borne in mind, however, that the nationality test has
one great disadvantage. It is conceivable that a landed immigrant or
permanent resident who has built up considerable ties with his new
country might run afoul of the law while abroad. Then, by the provisions
of treaties and conventions based on his formal qualification, such an
individual is not eligible for transfer to the country in which he is
domiciled in order to serve his sentence close to friends and relatives
in an environment which is more familiar and beneficial to him.
An argument that such persons are not entitled to diplomatic pro-
tection abroad under traditional international law and practice does not
address the very issue and idea behind the prisoner transfer scheme.
Thus, for example, a permanent resident of the United States who has
declared his or her intention to become a citizen, but has not yet been
sworn as a citizen, and who is convicted of an offense while vacationing
abroad is ineligible for transfer to the United States. This exclusion
could be the basis of a challenge to the constitutionality of the relevant
treaty and implementing statute on equal protection grounds.15 The
exclusion is also in contravention of the underlying purposes of the
treaties and domestic legislation.
Therefore the domicile (residence) test offers a better and more
flexible solution. First and foremost, it implies that the nationality of
the convicted person has not the same paramount importance as in
extradition matters. For the purposes of a prisoner transfer treaty, the
basic consideration is that, whatever the offender's nationality, the judg-
14. Gregory Gelfand, International Penal Transfer Treaties: The Case for an Unres-
tricted Multilateral Treaty, 64 B.U. L. Rev. 600 (1984). However, the author is willing
to allow the transfer of nationals of the sentencing state, if any, only under special
circumstances delineated in a treaty. Id.
15. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Transfer Between the United States and Mexico and the
United States and Canada, in Vol. II International Criminal Law 244 (M. Cherif Bassiouni,
ed., 1986). The narrowness of the class of persons who can be transferred under the
treaties signed by Canada is also criticized in that country. See Allan J. Nazarevich, The
Transfer of Offenders Act and Related Treaties: An Analysis, 4 Crim. Rep. 226 (1978).
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ment shall not only be enforced in the state which rendered it, but also
where it can most advantageously be done. Indirectly, nationality may
be relevant to the place of enforcement. For example, if the convicted
person cannot be extradited because he is a national of the requested
state, enforcement in that state of the judgment passed abroad is some-
times the only way justice can be done. At the same time, the enforce-
ment of a judgment in a familiar milieu to the offender is more likely
to facilitate his social rehabilitation.
The 1970 European Convention on the International Validity of
Criminal Judgments expressed this idea. Under this Convention, a pris-
oner is eligible for transfer to another state to serve his sentence there
only if he is "ordinarily resident" in that country (Article 5(a)) and
that country is the "state of origin" of the sentenced person (Article
5(d)). In this context, "state of origin," irrespective of interpretative
problems it may raise, does not necessarily mean the state of which the
convicted person is a national. It can denote, for example, that state
in which the prisoner has passed the greater part of his life, and in
consequence, with whose way of life and general conditions he is most
familiar.' 6 The same wording was retained in the International Law
Association Model Convention on Expatriation of Accused Persons for
Trial and Sentence and in one bilateral treaty. 7 Also the Benelux Con-
vention on the Enforcement of Criminal Judgments of 1968 seems to
be based on the domicile (residence) test.
As far as domestic legislation is concerned, the domicile (residence)
test is adopted in all three modern comprehensive laws on international
legal cooperation (assistance) in criminal matters, namely in Austria,
Switzerland, and Germany. However, unlike the Austrian ARHG and
German IRG, the Swiss IRSG adopts this test for both inward and
outward transfers, whereas the Austrian and German statutes limit the
scope of their application to outward transfers only. The German IRG,
for instance, provides that a foreigner convicted and incarcerated in
German territory may be transferred to a foreign state if he is domiciled
or has his residence there, if he is staying there, or if an enforcement
in that state is in the interest of the person convicted or in the public
interest (Section 71(1)). At the same time, a German citizen may be
transferred abroad if he has his domicile or residence in a foreign state
or is staying there (Section 71(2)).
Similarly, under the Austrian ARHG, an Austrian national is not
eligible for transfer to a foreign state unless he has his domicile or
residence there or has been found there (Section 76(3)(1)). It is note-
16. Explanatory Report on the European Convention on the International Validity
of Criminal Judgments, Strasbourg 32 (1970).
17. See Spain-Denmark, Feb. 3, 1972 (BOE 1973, No. 99), Article 5(a) and (d).
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worthy that the Swiss IRSG offers the broadest and most flexible so-
lution. The only criterion for the prisoner's eligibility for inward transfer
is his permanent residence in Switzerland or criminal proceedings pending
against him in that country (Article 94 (1)(a)), while a person sentenced
in Switzerland, whether a Swiss national or not, may be transferred to
a foreign state if there are good reasons to expect that the transfer will
contribute to a better social rehabilitation of that person (Article 100).
III. CONSENT OF THE PRISONER
A. Rationale Behind the Requirement of Consent to Transfer
A problem arises within the framework of prisoner transfer and
reciprocal enforcement of criminal judgments concerning the role of the
individual. The underlying but central thrust of such a concept is a
humanitarian attempt to assist offenders in readapting to society. In-
dividuals, not states, are primarily benefitted. Difficulties could arise
where the sentencing state and the enforcing state agree to transfer an
alien to his home country, but, for a valid reason, the prisoner refuses
to be returned. Similar problems might arise where the sentencing state
and the enforcing state refuse to recognize an agreement which provides
for the return of the convicted person. Consideration of this problem
may be tempered by the knowledge that individuals have always indirectly
held certain rights in the international community. When an individual
is harmed by another state, the state of the victim's nationality has a
customary duty to champion his cause. 8
The recent tendency, particularly in international criminal law, has
been to extend the scope of public international law to cover matters
concerning the individual. The Universal Declaration on Human Rights
and the European Convention on Human Rights have bestowed a new
status on individuals in the eyes of international law. The individual
has become responsible for his acts under certain circumstances. Simi-
larly, the individual has the status to complain to an international body
that his rights have been violated.1 9 The emergence of humanitarian
international law gave rise to a new legal status for the individual, thus
18. Draft Convention on Responsibility of States for Damage Done in Their Territory
to the Person or Property of Foreigners, Research in International Law of the Harvard
Law School, 23 Am. J. Int'l L. 1929, Suppl., 133.
19. Rosalyn Higgins, Conceptual Thinking About the Individual in International Law,
4 Brit. J. Int'l Stud. 1-19 (1978). See bibliography note on the status of individuals in
international law by Louis B. Sohn & Thomas Buergenthal, International Protection of
Human Rights, 19-21 (1973).
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placing some limitations on the power of the respective sovereigns. 20
To require the prisoner's consent may, at first, seem a surprising
conclusion since deportation and extradition, which have some analogy
to transfer, obviously do not require the consent of the person concerned.
It should be borne in mind that the differences between deportation
and extradition, on the one hand, and transfer, on the other, are in
this respect more significant than the similarities. Deportation and ex-
tradition are essentially acts of a state carried out in the public interest.
Occasionally, they may coincide with the wishes of the person concerned;
but more often, in the nature of the situation, they will run contrary
to them. The exercise of both procedures is justified in the public interest.
In the case of deportation, public interest justifies ridding the country
of undesirable persons who have entered it and have no right to remain
in it. In the case of extradition, the international public interest is in
seeing fugitive criminals brought to justice.
Comparable considerations do not apply to the transfer of prisoners.
Although there are significant arguments based on public interest in
favour of prisoners serving sentences in their own countries, the public
interest is not seriously damaged if an individual prisoner of overseas
origin serves his sentence in that country. Indeed, that has always been
the normal expectation of the courts and of offenders. The offender's
consent, widely acknowledged as an integral part of the transfer of
prisoners concept, is predicated on two bases. The first stems from the
humanitarian purpose of the treaties. As was rightly noted by the Ju-
diciary Committee of the U.S. Congress, "incarceration in one's own
country is severe enough punishment. Service of a custodial term in a
foreign jail creates special hardships upon the individual offender, and
his family."'2
To the extent that incarceration in the offender's own nation would
promote rehabilitation, transfer would further the interests of the of-
fender by hastening reintegration into society. Only voluntary transfer,
however, would help achieve this goal. Since an important objective of
transfer is to further the interests of the prisoner (with regard to treat-
ment in prison and resettlement within his own community), it would
be unsound in principle, and indeed anomalous, to force transfer upon
an unwilling prisoner. The humanitarian concern for the inmate is the
concern allowing him to have the choice-to some extent-as to where
and in what sort of prison environment he serves his sentence. It is
also the concern that the inmate can be given the opportunity to re-
20. M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Extradition and World Public Order 2 (1974);
Otto Lagodny, Die Rechtsstellung des Auszulieferenden in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland
35 (1987).
21. H.R. Rep. No. 95-720, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1977).
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habilitate himself in an environment which he assumes to be more
conducive to such a goal. It is true, however, that the choice to be
transferred is not entirely in the inmate's hands but requires the approval
of both the transferring and the receiving (administering) state, as well
as that of the province to which the inmate is transferred, if he is going
to a provincial institution.22
The second rationale for requiring the offender's consent to a trans-
fer is to insulate the transfer from constitutional attack. In deciding
whether to consent to transfer, the offender must weigh competing
considerations. It is worth stressing that many prisoners, in deciding
whether to accept a transfer, will have some very difficult choices to
make. Although they may find themselves in much better conditions if
they return home to serve the remainder of their sentences, they will
also return to face sentences of lengths of which they can be fairly
certain. Normally, they will have a fairly clear idea of how long they
will spend in prison. However, in many other countries where people
will be serving sentences, there are irregular amnesties, and people may
be freed on the whim of an individual. So they will have to gamble,
as it were, on the likelihood of getting a fairly early release from very
bad conditions as opposed to serving a slightly longer sentence in better
conditions.
Obviously, one of the factors that will be important to the prisoners
is to know not only whether they will, on return, have to serve the
remainder of the sentence for the offense of which they have been
convicted abroad but also whether they will face further, perhaps more
serious, charges. These may be charges connected with the offense for
which they have been convicted abroad and for which they may feel
they already have been sufficiently sentenced. There are a number of
situations one can see in which it would be important for the prisoner
to have access to such information. 23
Many of the reasons an offender would desire a transfer are obvious.
As noted, incarceration in one's own nation facilitates contact with
family, friends, and legal counsel. Furthermore, rehabilitation may be
enhanced within an institution in which an offender can obtain suitable
vocational training and education in his or her own language and culture.
Possibilities of work release and arrangements for post-release employ-
ment are greater where contact with prospective employers is possible.
The possibility of discrimination against an offender because of "for-
eign" status would also be reduced.
Despite all of these reasons, however, an offender may opt to remain
incarcerated in the foreign state. The offender may have family members
22. See, e.g., the Canadian Transfer of Offenders Act 1978, § 6(2); the United States-
Canadian treaty, Article 111(5); the Canadian-Mexican treaty, Article 4(6).
23. House of Lords, Hansard, Mar. 5, 1984, col. 50 (Lord Melchett).
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or substantial economic interests and assets in that nation and thus may
choose to serve the sentence there instead of returning to the state of
his nationality. Moreover, correctional institutions in some countries
permit conjugal visits, provide opportunities for in-prison business, and
allow prisoners to abstain from prison labor.24 For offenders with suf-
ficient and available resources, spacious and comfortable cells, good
food, and even fellow-prisoner servants are available. 2 In addition, such
considerations as possible prosecution for offenses either associated with
the crime for which the offender was incarcerated or for other offenses
may deter the individual from returning to his home country. 26
It should not, therefore, be thought that, in all cases, prisoners
want to be repatriated. 27 It should be borne in mind that the social
consequences of conviction ("stigmatization") and the service of the
custodial sentence in a prisoner's own country are much more severe
than those produced by a notification coming from a foreign state. 2
Finally, an innocent person mistakenly apprehended for the possession
of narcotics, which may even have been planted on him, and subsequently
convicted on the basis of a torture-won confession may want to gather
new evidence in order to challenge his conviction through re-opening
the proceedings, re-trying the case, or bringing an extraordinary appeal
against a judgment which has become final. It is conceivable that some
offenders might resist transfer even when the transfer is in their own
best interests. Even so, if abuses are to be avoided and a system
established for humanitarian ends rather than government convenience,
it is vital that transfer should be dependent on prisoner consent.
B. Possible Exceptions to and Arguments Against the Prisoner
Consent Requirement
The more similarity there is between the criminal systems, traditions,
and policies of the cooperating states, the less reason there might be
to afford the person concerned an enforceable right to challenge a
24. On the situation in Mexican prisons, see U.S. Citizens Imprisoned in Mexico:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on International Political and Military Affairs of the
House Comm. on International Relations (pt. 11), 94th Cong., 1st and 2nd Sess. 39 (1975-
1976).
25. See. supra note 24.
26. Abraham Abramovsky & Steven J. Eagle, A Critical Evaluation of the Mexican-
American Transfer of Penal Sanctions Treaty, 64 Iowa L. Rev. 298 (1979).
27. House of Lords, Hansard, Dec. 21, 1983, col. 768 (Baronesse Maclead of Borve).
28. Johann Ungern-Sternberg, Verfolgungs - und Vollstreckungshindernisse als Rechts-
folge von Strafverfolgungsersuchen, 94 ZStW 89 (1982).
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decision to transfer his case or sentence abroad.29 If, however, the
standards of justice and the criminal policies vary considerably from
one state to the other, a fact which cannot simply be ignored, the only
way to make the interstate cooperation possible in such cases is by
hiding the fundamental differences under the cover of the consent of
the person concerned, however questionable it may be that persons may
consent to waive rights and freedoms to which they normally would
have been entitled.
Although there seems to be consensus as to the rights and active
role of an individual (a "subject" instead of an "object") in international
criminal law as well as to the fact that his will and interests must not
be ignored, these issues still raise controversies concerning the scope of
legal relevancy and validity of his statement of consent. It is very much
doubtful whether full binding force can be attributed to his consent,
irrespective of the form of international cooperation in criminal matters.
It is not unthinkable that the offender's veto might be detrimental to
vital interests of criminal justice involved in a particular form of that
cooperation. An offender must not, therefore, withhold his consent as
long as his veto would inevitably lead to his unpunishability. 0 By the
same token, the prisoner's consent should not be required in cases where
his refusal would completely preclude the sanction from being enforced
in either country. Such a situation may take place where an offender,
after having been sentenced to imprisonment in the state of loci delicti
commissi, managed to leave that territory and return to his home coun-
try. It seems reasonable, then, to expect that the consent of the defendant
has no constitutive significance for the validity of the transfer; instead,
the defendant should have a right to be heard and to have his opinion
taken into account.3 As early as 1885, it was suggested that a "right
of option" (droit d'option) should be guaranteed in an international
treaty to a prisoner before he is transferred to another state, for he
may have important reasons to serve his term in the sentencing state.32
Nevertheless, it is controversial whether a concept of a "tripartite
agreement" can validly be used in the context of prisoner transfer. It
29. Expanding Scope of Extradition and Judicial Assistance and Cooperation in Penal
Matters, in New Horizons in International Criminal Law, 79, 82, International Institute
of Higher Studies in Criminal Sciences (1985).
30. Some restrictions must be put on the offender's right to choose between the
transfer of criminal proceedings and the transfer of ,penal sanctions. On the "droit
d'option," see Peter Polt, The Treatment of Foreigners in the Hungarian Criminal Justice
System, in Papers on Crime Policy II, HEUNI 164 (1986); Robert Linke, Das neue Recht
der Internationalen Rechtshilfe in Strafsachen, 96 ZStW 594 (1984).
31. Thio Vogler, General Report, 55 RIDP, No. 1-2, 56 (1984).
32. Edward Brusa, Report presented at the Third International Penal and Penitentiary
Congress in Rome, Actes du Congr s p~nitentiaire international, Rome 1887, vol. I, 467.
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could be argued that the prisoner's consent should not be underestimated,
as compared with that given by the states concerned, since the transfer
is dependent on the consent of both the sentencing and enforcing states
as well as on that of the prisoner.33 On the other hand, it must not
be ignored that a transfer is effected on the basis of an agreement
between these states, provided that the requirements inserted into an
international treaty and domestic law are met, e.g., that a prisoner
consents to his transfer. It is, therefore, misleading to refer to individual
transfer agreements as "tripartite agreements," because the prisoner
himself cannot be a party in international relations. His consent is of
minor significance in comparison with the sovereign state's agreement.14
The concept of a "tripartite agreement" as applied to prisoner
transfer would create a departure from the most fundamental principles
underlying all forms of international cooperation in criminal matters,
with no valid reason." Since a transfer agreement is an international
instrument, the only subjects with the authority to make a decision are
the sovereign states, which have to agree on the means, requirements,
and circumstances for such cooperation. Although the underlying prin-
ciple of the prisoner transfer as adopted in the vast majority of bilateral
treaties is the tripartite consent of the states concerned and the prisoner,
these instruments cannot be regarded as tripartite (individual) agreements,
as only states are parties to international treaties.
The opponents of the idea of the prisoner's consent consider it an
unprecedented requirement and a "strange body" in the system of law
governing international legal assistance. 6 The main arguments against
this idea are threefold:
(1) The general requirement of the prisoner's consent is un-
desirable from a practical point of view as it is detrimental to
the whole prisoner transfer scheme. 7 Since any transfer might
be stopped by an offender, this form of international cooperation
would be put in jeopardy. Furthermore, since both states con-
33. The resolution of the European Preparatory Meeting does not distinguish between
the agreement of the states concerned and the consent of the prisoner. See Report of the
European Preparatory Meeting on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders,
A/CONF. 121/RPM/I, para. 100 (June 6-10, 1983).
34. Helmut Epp, Transfer of Prisoners: The European Convention, in Vol. II In-
ternational Criminal Law 263 (M. Cherif Bassiouni, ed.,1986); id., Der Auslander im
Strafvollzug, OJZ 1982, 121.
35. Peter Wilkitzki, Rechtshilfe durch Vollstreckung §§ 48ff, 71 IRG. Zur praktischen
Anwendung des neuen Rechtsinstituts, JR 235 (1983).
36. Th~o Vogler, Zur Rechtshilfe durch Vollstreckung auslandischer Strafurteile, in
Festschrift fuir H.H. Jescheck 1383 (Th~o Vogler, ed., 1985).
37. Friedrich Christian Schroeder, Ubertragung der Strafvollstreckung, 96 ZStW 460
(1986).
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cerned are entitled to grant amnesty and/or pardon, the reasons
of criminal policy in either state may have an idle bearing on
a prisoner's willingness to give or to withhold his consent.
(2) The consent of an offender has only internal and procedural
significance in the framework of international legal assistance. 8
Unlike a simplified extradition, in the context of a prisoner
transfer, the consent of the sentenced person does not exclude
the exequatur proceedings and does not make them superfluous.39
This argument is somewhat confusing, as the main issue in this
framework is not that the prisoner's consent might create suf-
ficient grounds for his transfer, even though the substantial
requirements are not met, but rather an assumption that the
prisoner should be entrusted with the right to withhold his
consent, thereby avoiding a compulsory transfer against his will.
(3) The sentenced person is transferred in order to serve, or
to continue serving, his sentence in his home country. As between
a prisoner seeking transfer and the prison authorities of the
sentencing state, transfer could be seen to be analogous with
other discretionary acts of the authorities, such as transfer to
another prison or early release on parole. Since these acts un-
dertaken in the course of execution of penal sanctions are co-
ercive measures which are being applied against the will of the
person concerned, nobody can require his consent to justify their
use. 4o
Last, but not least, it is the enforcing state which is empowered to
agree to the transfer, and its requirement was imposed in the interest
of the protection of the sovereign, not the individual. Therefore, a
prisoner may not benefit from the internationally recognized prohibition
to enforce foreign penal judgments without the consent of the state
concerned .4
The question arises as to whether there should be any exceptions
to the rule that a transfer can take place only with the consent of the
prisoner. The most obvious case in which the consent might be considered
unnecessary is that where a deportation order has been made against
the prisoner. Since he will be returned to his own country at the end
of his sentence (normal practice where a prisoner is made the subject
38. Vogler, supra note 36, 1384.
39. Hans Heinrich Jescheck, Die Vollstreckung auslandischer Straferkenntnisse in der
Bundesrepublik Deutschland, in Festschrift fir H. von Weber 338 (1963).
40. Annemarie Hammerstein, Die Wirkung auslindischer Strafurteile im Inland 62,
279 (1964).
41. Judgment of the German Federal Constitutional Court, Mar. 22, 1983, 2 BvR
475/78, 63 BVerfGE, 363, 373 (1983).
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of a deportation order), there are clearly grounds for arguing that he
should go as soon as possible, provided that the sending state is satisfied
that he will serve his full sentence.
On the other hand, there is a distinct difference between requiring
someone to leave a country without any restriction on him after his
departure and requiring him to serve a sentence in conditions which
may be different, and perhaps worse, than those of anyone else sentenced
to the same sentence for the same offense in the same country. Therefore,
the normal consent requirement should apply, while recognizing that,
in practice, there may be little if any issue here-if a prisoner knows
that he is compelled to leave the country at the end of his sentence,
he may be more inclined to seek early transfer. If, on the other hand,
the consent requirement were to be dispensed with in cases where there
was a susceptibility to deportation, a natural corollary would be an
appeal procedure similar to that provided for deportation.
Another situation in which consent should not be necessary is the
one where a visitor from abroad, who has been in the country for a
very short time-perhaps as a tourist or student, has committed a crime
serious enough to receive a custodial sentence. The arguments here, as
in the case where a deportation order has been made, are fairly evenly
balanced. But, if the consent of the prisoner is to be a normal pre-
condition, there should be no exception. It is doubtful whether the time
and expense involved in an unavoidable special appeal procedure could
really be justified, especially since a prisoner who has no ties with this
country is unlikely to withhold consent to transfer without good cause.
C. Approaches to the Prisoner's Consent: A Comparative Overview
The diversity of doctrinal views on the role of an individual within
the framework of international cooperation in criminal matters is re-
flected in the variety of solutions adopted in international instruments
of transfer. Generally, two models have been developed in this area.
Under one system, the transfer is based on the consent of a prisoner,
and this requirement is of utmost importance for various reasons. In
the other model, the offender's consent is not mentioned among the
conditions for transfer. Therefore, this model is based on mandatory
transfer. Surprisingly enough, the latter system is adopted in the vast
majority of multilateral conventions and uniform legislation, with only
two out of the total of seven instruments following the former system".4
42. Epp erroneously believes that only the 1970 European Convention and the Berlin
Convention do not require the prisoner's consent. See Epp, supra note 34, at 264. The
authors of the Explanatory Notes on the U.N. Model Agreement on the Transfer of
Foreign Prisoners are also not correct in saying that the system of voluntary transfer is
embodied in most regional arrangements. See A/CONF. 121/10, para. 14.
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Those two are the 1983 Council of Europe Convention and the 1986
Commonwealth Scheme. At the same time, the proportion between
bilateral treaties, which adopted the consent system and those which
adopted the mandatory system, is inverse as compared to such proportion
between multilatoral conventions.
A review of international instruments and domestic legislation from
historical perspective reveals a departure from a mandatory transfer, on
the one hand, and a tendency towards making it dependent on the
prisoner's consent, on the other. None of the multilateral agreements
on the enforcement of foreign penal judgments and no domestic laws
in the nineteenth century ever mentioned the consent of an offender.
This attitude was still very common in the sixties. The two 1964 con-
ventions and the 1970 Convention elaborated within the Council of
Europe disregarded the consent of the person concerned. The same
system was adopted in the uniform legislation of the Nordic countries
in 1963 and in the 1968 Benelux Convention. Domestic laws, too, such
as the 1965 Turkish Law on Enforcement of Sanctions and the 1969
Rumanian Code of Criminal Procedure, followed this pattern.
The first instrument which broke with that traditional ideology and
introduced the prisoner's consent into international practice was the 1974
treaty between France and Cameroon. 41 However, another treaty proved
to be more influential and to have a much greater bearing on the
development of that idea in the international arena, that is the United
States-Mexican Treaty on the Execution of Penal Sentences of 1976."
It was followed by the United States-Canadian treaty of 1977 and several
agreements signed by each of these states with other countries. The
requirement of the offender's consent is, therefore, a relatively new
condition in the framework of prisoner transfer and has gained an
understanding and broader acceptance in both treaty practice and do-
mestic legislation over the last ten to fourteen years. The Turkish Law
of 1965 ceased to have effect, and the new law of 1984 is based on
the system of voluntary transfer. 45 All modern domestic legislation on
international legal assistance, such as the American, Canadian, French,
English, and Dutch laws, affirm the idea of the prisoner's consent.
It must, however, be borne in mind that there are still international
instruments, both multilateral and bilateral, concluded in the late sev-
enties and eighties which are based on mandatory transfer. This group
includes the 1978 Berlin Convention and the 1983 Arab Convention, on
the one hand, and some bilateral treaties, particularly those modeled
43. See the French-Cameroon treaty, Article 27.
44. See the United States-Mexico treaty, Article IV(2).
45. See Turkish Law No. 3002 of 1984, Article 3(l)(b).
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after the 1970 European Convention 46 and the Berlin Convention, on
the other. The Berlin Convention is clearly based on two grounds:
(1) a belief that the transfer of penal judgments is an instrument
for the prevention of possible conflicts of jurisdiction between
states and an instrument of international cooperation in criminal
matters, and, therefore, such an instrument should not depend
on the offender's particular views; and
(2) a general assumption that a transfer of the sentenced person
to his home state is always more profitable for him than serving
the sentence abroad.4 7
The system of mandatory transfer was adopted in all the treaties
concluded by Poland and the former G.D.R. with the developing coun-
tries. Interestingly enough, the treaties between Eastern European and
Western countries adhere to the idea of consented transfer. As far as
French agreements with African states are concerned, nearly one-third
of them are based on the system of voluntary transfer. It is noteworthy
that all French treaties concluded after February 1974 explicitly require
the offender's consent.48
The modern and overwhelming tendency toward making the prisoner
transfer scheme dependent on the consent of the sentenced person can
be traced within the International Association of Penal Law and the
United Nations. Resolution IIIB of section four, adopted at the Ninth
International Congress of Penal Law, mentioned the restricted role of
an offender only in the context of extradition, while saying that, when
it is possible either to extradite a convicted person to the sentencing
state or to enforce the penalty in the state of residence, the person
concerned should at least be heard before a decision is made.4 9 Over a
decade later, the participants to the Thirteenth Congress emphasized
that as long as the offender is imprisoned in the sentencing state, such
a transfer should be effected only with the prisoner's consent.5 0
Similarly, Resolution Thirteen of the Sixth United Nations Congress
on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders allowed
the transfer to take place in the prisoner's interest but -without his
46. See the Spanish-Danish treaty of 1972.
47. Michael Plachta, Transfer of Proceedings and Transfer of Prisoners: New In-
struments of Cooperation in Criminal Matters among the Socialist Countries of Eastern
Europe, 3 Conn. J. Int'l L. 329 (1988).
48. See the French treaties with the following countries: Cameroon-Article 27; Benin-
Article 72; Chad-Article 29; Morocco-Article 4(a); Djibouti-Article 4(d).
49. Ninth International Congress on Penal Law. Resolutions, The Hague 489 (1964).
50. XIII Congres International de Droit Penal. Resolutions, 56 Revue internationale
de droit penal No. 3-4, 548 (1985).
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consent, 51 whereas the Model Agreement on the Transfer of Foreign
Prisoners adopted at the Seventh Congress requires the indispensable
consent of the prisoner for any transfer.12 It was argued that the re-
quirement of consent ensures that transfers are not used as a method
of expelling prisoners or as a means of disguised extradition." However,
the 1988 United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances provides that, if an extradition re-
quested for purposes of enforcing a sentence is refused because the
person sought is a national of the requested state, the enforcement of
such a sentence may take place in the requested state even without the
consent of an offender (Article 6(10)).
D. Obligation to Provide a Prisoner with Information: An
Indispensable Constituent of His Consent
1. Solutions Adopted in Irfternational Instruments
Any sentenced person who may be eligible for transfer, especially
those of foreign origin, should be informed of the possibilities as well
as the requirements and the legal consequences of such a transfer. If
all relevant information is not furnished to the prisoner, his consent
cannot be considered to be knowingly and intelligently given. The drafters
of the United Nations Model Agreement proposed that the offender be
fully informed of the possible legal consequences of a transfer, in
particular, whether he might be prosecuted because of other offenses
committed before his transfer (Section 1(6)). As this depends also on
the domestic law of the enforcing state, that state should be involved
in the information procedure.
Typically, a convention or treaty provides that a convicted offender
to whom this instrument may apply shall be informed by competent
authorities of the sentencing state of the substance of the agreement.
However, only three multilateral conventions contain provisions to that
effect. They are the Commonwealth Scheme, the 1983 Council of Europe
Convention, and the Berlin Convention. The first imposes a duty on
the sentencing state to furnish the enforcing state with any information
51. Resolution 13(1) reads as follows: "[Congress) urges Member States to consider
the establishment of procedures whereby such transfers of offenders may be effected,
recognizing that any such procedures can only be undertaken with the consent of both
the sending and receiving countries and either with the consent of the prisoner or in his
interest." A/CONF. 87/14/Rev. 1 (emphasis added).
52. See Model Agreement, § 1(5), A/CONF. 121/22, p. 58. The need for the consent
of a prisoner as a precondition for transfer was emphasized at the European and Asian
Preparatory Meetings, A/CONF. 121/RPM/I, para. 93, 100.
53. See Explanatory Notes on the Model Agreement, supra note 42, para. 14.
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which that country may specify as required in all cases to enable it to
inform the prisoner of the full consequences of transfer for him under
the law of the sentencing state (Section 5(1)(g)).
The Berlin Convention is even more laconic at this point. Pursuant
to Article 5(3), the convicted person shall be informed of the possibility
of applying to either state for the formal request. This provision is
extremely vague, as it fails to answer several basic questions: who should
furnish the information to the person concerned; and when and how
should this task be accomplished? Moreover, the Convention should
also refer to an "accused" rather than merely a "convicted person" in
order to make the respective provision applicable to the entire criminal
proceedings.54 It is conceivable that a foreign offender, having been
informed of the possibility of being transferred to his home country,
will not care to appeal the judgment and try instead to make the
judgment valid and final as soon as possible and then seek a transfer.
Regrettably, neither Polish 5 nor Russian 6 domestic legislation ensures
that authorized, competent authorities furnish the information nor specify
the way for doing so.
As far as bilateral treaties are concerned, nearly half of them oblige
the sentencing state, or in some instances both states involved, to provide
a foreign offender with all appropriate information specified therein. 7
Of thirteen bilateral treaties signed by the United States and Canada,
six contain provisions to that effect." Oddly enough, the "model treaty"
between the United States and Mexico does not provide for such an
obligation, whereas the duty to furnish information exists under other
treaties concluded subsequently by Mexico. 59 All Thai treaties provide
that either party may inform, or shall have the right to inform, an
offender who is within the scope of the treaty of the substance of the
respective agreement.6° All but one Spanish treaty follow the same pat-
tern. 61
54. Plachta, supra note 47, at 332.
55. See Decree issued by the Minister of Justice and the Minister of National Defense,
Apr. 16, 1980, Dziennik Urzedowy Ministerstwa Sprawiedliwosci No. 3, item 11 (1980).
56. See Decree issued by the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the USSR, Aug.
10, 1979, Vedomosti Verchovnogo Soveta SSSR, No. 33, item 540 (1979).
57. See, e.g., the Greek-Egyptian treaty, Article 5.
58. See the United States and Canadian treaties with France-Articles 8 and XII,
respectively, and Thailand-Article III(1) as well as the Canadian treaties with the United
States-Article 111(2), and Mexico-Article IV(1).
59. See the Mexican treaties with Canada-Article IV(I), and Spain-Article 6.
60. The wording of the Thai-Swedish treaty differs from other treaties in that it
provides that either party shall endeavour to inform an offender, Article IV(I).
61. See the Spanish treaties with Argentina-Article 5(1); Peru-Article 5(2); and
Mexico-Article 6.
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It is noteworthy that the obligation to keep foreign offenders in-
formed of the substance of prisoner transfer agreements is provided for
in the vast majority of treaties concluded by the Eastern European
countries with both Western states62 and developing countries.63 Inter-
estingly enough, in one treaty, the emphasis has been shifted from the
obligation of a state to furnish the relevant information, to the right
of a prisoner to be informed of the possibilities under the agreement. 4
It should be noted that only two treaties signed by France with African
countries impose such a duty on either state involved. 65
2. Recommendation No. R(84)11 of the Committee of Ministers
of the Council of Europe
To make a prisoner aware of the possibilities for transfer offered
by the 1983 Convention and the legal consequences which a transfer to
his home country would have, Article 4(1) provides that any sentenced
person who may be eligible shall be informed, by the sentencing state,
of the convention's substance. The information will enable him to decide
whether to express an interest in being transferred.
Recommendation R(84)11-which was adopted by the Committee of
Ministers on June 21, 1984-is intended to assist contracting states in
fulfilling their obligations under Article 4(1) of the Convention. Con-
sidering it essential to provide the information on the Convention's
substance in a language which the prisoner understands, the Recom-
mendation sets out a standard text to be used for conveying that in-
formation to potential transferees. Governments are advised to provide
an authoritative translation of this standard text in their official language
or languages, taking into account any reservations or declarations to
the Convention of which potential transferees would need to be aware.
They are to deposit the translation with the Secretary General of the
Council of Europe who will forward copies of all the translations so
received to each of the contracting states for use by their prison au-
thorities.
The standard text annexed to the Recommendation gives a brief
description of the transfer mechanism. In particular, it explains the
conditions under which persons who have received a custodial sentence
62. See the Hungarian treaties with Austria-Article 2, Portugal-Article 4(I), and
Turkey-Article 2; the Polish treaties with Austria-Article 3, and Turkey-Article 30;
as well as the Yugoslav-Turkish treaty-Article 8(3).
63. See the Polish treaties with Libya-Article 43(3), and Syria-Article 51(3). See
also treaties signed by the G.D.R. with Congo-Article 62(3), Angola-Article 47(3), and
Rumania-Article 79(3).
64. See the Hungarian-Portuguese treaty-Article 4(1).
65. See the French treaties with Morocco-Article 5, and Djibouti-Article 5.
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in a country other than their own may be transferred to their home
country to serve the sentence there. The standard text gives answers to
such questions as:
-Who has to agree to the transfer?
-Who may benefit from a transfer?
-What sentence would need to be served following a transfer?
In addition, it provides information on such matters as prosecution for
other offenses, pardon, amnesty, commutation of sentence, review of
the original judgment, termination of enforcement, and the transfer
procedure.
The proposed exchange of translations will greatly facilitate the
practical application of the Convention: it enables prison authorities in
contracting states to inform foreign prisoners about the possibilities of
transfer under the Convention without the need to translate this infor-
mation into the prisoner's language. At the same time, the information
contained in the standard text helps the prisoner to decide, with full
knowledge of the legal consequences, whether he should express an
interest in being transferred and, later on, whether he should consent
to his transfer.
3. Domestic Legislation
Since there are countries that are willing to develop international
cooperation in criminal matters on the basis of their domestic laws,
even though they are not signatories to agreements, and since some
multilateral conventions and bilateral treaties are silent on making foreign
offenders aware of the possibilities under the prisoner transfer arrange-
ments, one could reasonably expect that domestic legislation would spec-
ify an authority obliged to furnish the information and prescribe the
procedure to be followed in such instances. The information is of
particular importance where the transfer is to be commenced on the
request of the sentenced person. Surprisingly enough, very few legal
systems contain provisions to that effect.
Although none of the three comprehensive laws on international
(legal) assistance in criminal matters, (the ARHG, the IRG, and the
IRSG) impose such an obligation, they all provide for a hearing before
a magistrate before the decision to transfer a prisoner to a foreign
country is taken. The judge shall, therefore, inform the person concerned
of the substance requirements and legal consequences of his transfer. 6
66. It should be noted, however, that the information on the substance and legal
consequences of the transfer is of much less significance to the prisoner in the system,
such as that under the Austrian ARHG, Section 76(8), where the role of the transferee
is limited to being heard, as the transfer can be effected even without his consent and
against his will.
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It is the usual practice of the Dutch authorities to provide all foreign
prisoners who are eligible for transfer with a booklet, in a language
they understand, containing information on the procedure and conditions
of the transfer.
Pursuant to the Canadian Transfer of Offenders Act 1978, the
Solicitor General shall, on the request of a foreign offender, provide
him with a copy of the treaty on the transfer of offenders entered into
between Canada and the foreign state designated in the request (Section
20). Furthermore, Canada, desiring that the transfer procedure be carried
out in a swift and efficient manner, concluded administrative arrange-
ments on the transfer of sentenced persons with several countries-
signatories of the 1983 Council of Europe Convention. Under these
agreements, the Correctional Service of Canada is obligated to furnish
the following documents to convicted foreign citizens to whom the
Convention may apply:
(1) standard text providing information on the Convention (see
the preceding paragraph),
(2) copy of the Convention,
(3) copy of the Transfer of Offenders Act,
(4) application for transfer form; and
(5) any other document as may be prescribed by either party
(Article 3(1) and Annex B).
A similar set of documents should be forwarded to Canadian citizens
sentenced and incarcerated in foreign countries who may fall within the
scope of the 1983 Convention (Article 4(1) and Annex D). Both Canada
and the United States have developed a system of information booklets
prepared by the Solicitor General and the Department of Justice, re-
spectively, which are given over to Canadians and Americans incarcerated
abroad. Such question and answer booklets contain information on the
respective bilateral treaty and its operation, the operation of Canadian
and United States parole laws, and the regulations of the Canadian and
United States Federal Prison Systems. The United States booklets provide
American prisoners in foreign countries with sufficient information to
estimate the customary range of months they would serve in American
prisons before release on parole.
The most exhaustive regulation of the matters relating to the "in-
formative" aspects of the prisoner's consent appears in the English
Repatriation of Prisoners Act 1984. Under this Act, the Secretary of
State shall not issue a warrant, other than one superseding an earlier
warrant, unless he is satisfied that all reasonable steps have been taken
to inform the prisoner in writing in his own language of the following:
(a) of the substance, so far as it is relevant to the prisoner's
case, of the international arrangements in accordance with which
it is proposed to transfer him;
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(b) of the effect in relation to the prisoner of the warrant which
is proposed to issue in respect of him under this Act;
(c) in the case of a transfer into the United Kingdom, of the
effect in relation to the prisoner of the law relating to his
detention under that warrant (including the effect of any en-
actment or instrument under which he may be released earlier
than provided for by the terms of the warrant);
(d) in the case of a transfer out of the United Kingdom, of the
effect in relation to the prisoner of so much of the law of the
country or territory to which he is to be transferred as has
effect with respect to transfers under those arrangements; and
(e) of the powers of the Secretary of State under section six of
this Act (revocation of a warrant). 67
During the Parliamentary debates, it was emphasized that the pri-
soner's "consent" should truly mean consent.68 This implies that a person
who gives consent really knows all the material facts that he needs to
know to make up his mind, whether he agrees or disagrees with the
transfer. It was urged that express reference should be made to the
effects of remission and parole on the length of the sentence the prisoner
could expect to serve after transfer as well as details of his earliest
possible release date, since these are perhaps the most crucial factors
influencing a prisoner's decision to consent. But the Government argued
that the wording of Section 1(4)(6) implied the effects of remission and
parole on the length of the sentence anyway. 69 It was also considered
important to inform the prisoner, prior to his consent, not only whether
any warrants are outstanding against him, but whether any charges are
to be brought against him. Where the governments are aware of further
charges outstanding, they should normally and routinely inform the
prisoner of them. It would require the government ,to take all reasonable
steps to ascertain whether any changes are intended to be brought against
him. The only way the courts could ever see that this was done would
be to see that the Secretary of State had inquired of every police force
that could do this. Such an operation would be, therefore, extremely
difficult from technical and bureaucratic points of view.70
It should be noted that the Home Office and the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office produced a guidance leaflet which gives a brief
outline of how British prisoners abroad may be able to transfer home
67. Repatriation of Prisoners Act 1984, § 1(4).
68. House of Lords, Hansard, Apr. 3, 1984, col. 622 (Lord Mishcon).
69. House of Lords, Hansard, Apr. 3, 1984, col. 623 (Lord Denning).
70. House of Lords, Hansard, Apr. 3, 1984, col. 629 (Lord Elton); col. 631 (Lord
Lloyd of Kilgerran); col. 632 (Lord Elton).
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to serve the rest of their sentences in a prison in the United Kingdom. 7'
Unlike the Canadian and American booklets, the leaflet gives only a
short explanation of the arrangements to help British prisoners abroad
and their relatives at home.
By providing offenders with counselling and with the various in-
formation booklets or leaflets they have prepared, the authorities of
several states have found the optimal way of ensuring that the offender
can make an informed decision. That the decision be an informed one
is made only more important when it is borne in mind that there is no
provision in either of the treaties or the domestic laws for the prisoner
to transfer back to the sentencing state if he finds himself dissatisfied
with his new prison environment. It would be optimal if the convicted
person had the possibility of consulting independent counsel, that is,
counsel not attached to the executive branch of the government, before
giving his consent to a transfer. 72
Regrettably, in some countries, neither domestic legislation 73 nor the
respective information booklets mention a right to counsel. There is
some indication given that this role might be at least partially fulfilled
by consular officers of the prisoner's country of residence. 74 However,
the role of these officials will have to be limited to providing information
to prospective transferees, because it is beyond their scope to provide
legal counsel. By the same token, Justice or State Department attorneys,
or officials of the ministry of justice or foreign affairs, respectively,
will be less than satisfactory for this purpose because of a possible
conflict of interest that may arise should the prisoner later challenge
the validity of his waiver. Thus, domestic legislation should provide for
private attorneys to be made available to those prisoners who are without
independent access to counsel.
E. Verification of Consent
As the sentenced person's consent to his transfer is one of the basic
elements of the transfer mechanism, it seems necessary that the sentencing
state should not only ensure that the consent is given voluntarily and
with full knowledge of the legal consequences that the transfer would
entail for the person concerned, but that the enforcing state also should
71. British Prisoners Abroad: Can I Be Transferred Home?, Guidance Leaflet, Home
Office and Foreign Commonwealth Office (London 1988).
72. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 4108(c) and 4109 (1978).
73. See, e.g., the British Repatriation of Prisoners Act and the Canadian Transfer
of Offenders Act.
74. See, e.g., the U.K. Information Leaflet, supra note 71, at Q. 11; Solicitor General
of Canada, Treaty Between Canada and the United States of America on the Transfer
of Offenders, at Pt. IV, Q. 2.
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have an opportunity to verify that the consent is given in accordance
with these conditions. The procedure of verification, along with other
issues, such as the competent authority, should be agreed upon between
the states concerned. The United Nations Model Agreement briefly states
that the administering state should be given the opportunity to verify
the free consent of the prisoner (Section 8).
Under the 1983 Council of Europe Convention, the sentencing state
shall ensure that the sentenced person who is required to give consent
to a transfer does so voluntarily and with full knowledge of the legal
consequences thereof (Article 7). The procedure for giving such consent
shall be governed by the law of the sentencing state. At the same time,
the sentencing state shall afford the enforcing state an opportunity to
verify, through a consular or other official agreed upon with the en-
forcing state, that the consent is given in accordance with these con-
ditions. Provisions to that effect are also adopted in the 1986
Commonwealth Scheme (Section 8).
Oddly enough, of five French treaties with African countries which
require the prisoner's consent, only one, that with Djibouti, provides
for its verification. 7" Contrary to this, all but two bilateral treaties
concluded by the United States and Canada with other countries em-
phasize the verification procedure.7 6 Typically, these treaties specify that
the sentencing country shall afford an opportunity to the enforcing
country, if it so desires, to verify, prior to the transfer, that the of-
fender's consent to the transfer is given voluntarily and with full knowl-
edge of the consequences thereof, through the officer designated by the
laws of the enforcing country.7 7 All Thai treaties follow this pattern. It
is noteworthy that of over twenty bilateral treaties concluded by Eur-
opean countries, only those signed by Spain with Argentina, Peru, and
Mexico provide for the procedure of verification. Except for the Hun-
garian-Portuguese treaty,7 8 no treaty between Eastern European and
Western countries contain provisions to that effect. Instead, they require
that the minutes of the proceedings before the magistrate be appended
to the request submitted by the sentencing state, which would confirm
the prisoner's consent. 79
75. France-Djibouti, Article 8. It is noteworthy that this provision was literally retained
from the 1983 Council of Europe Convention. Under the treaty between France and
Morocco, the sentencing state is obliged to furnish a copy of a statement made by the
magistrate, specifically demonstrating the consent given by the prisoner, Article 16.
76. Only the United States-Mexico and the Canada-France treaties do not regulate
the verification procedure. Instead the latter provides that the consent of the sentenced
person shall be in writing and shall be appended to the request for transfer, Article XXIV.
77. Only the American-French treaty specifies that the verifying officer shall be a
consul of the enforcing state, Article 12(2).
78. Hungary-Portugal treaty, Article 14.
79. See, e.g., the Austrian treaties with Yugoslavia-Article 28(2), and Hungary-
Article 24(2).
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Surprisingly enough, the procedure of verification was adopted in
very few European domestic legislation. It is not provided for in the
Eastern European states, Nordic countries, France, nor the United King-
dom. Of the three comprehensive laws on international (legal) assistance
in criminal matters, only the German IRG explicitly states that the
transfer, both inward and outward, shall be effected only if the sentenced
person, after being advised, consented to it and his consent has been
inserted into the court records, or he consented to it before a consular
officer who is empowered to authenticate expressions of will. 0 This
regulation was retained by the Turkish Law No. 3002 of 1984.81 Similar
procedure is provided for by the Dutch Law on the Transfer of En-
forcement of Criminal Judgments. The consent is given at the hearing
before the magistrate. The prisoner may be assisted by a counsel and
a consular or diplomatic officer of his home country. A copy of the
hearing record is furnished to the enforcing state.
Notwithstanding an absense of legislation governing the verification
of consent, it is a usual practice of the Home Office that where a
British citizen incarcerated abroad wishes to transfer to his home country,
the Ministry of Justice of the sentencing state is requested to provide
the Home Office with a written statement in English signed by the
prisoner recording his consent and witnessed by the prisoner's lawyer,
a local notary under arrangements made by the British consul, or by
the consul himself.82
Neither in the Canadian Transfer of Offenders Act, nor in the
booklet is it provided that the fullness and voluntariness of the offender's
consent to the transfer must be verified. This is unfortunate83 as the
Act purports to exhaust the procedure of transfer by its mandatory
language: a Canadian offender "shall be dealt with in accordance with
this Act" (Section 3). Except to the extent that the Solicitor General
supervises the verification of the offender's consent before approving
or disapproving a transfer, the Act does not contain a procedure designed
to verify the consent of the prisoner, especially that given or refused
on behalf of a minor. As no mention is made in Canadian bilateral
treaties, the Act, or the Canadian booklet as to how the officer des-
ignated under these treaties is to satisfy himself that the consent is
voluntary, it appears that Canada can take the word of the offender
given before the verifying officer in a foreign country as verification of
the prisoner's consent. 84
80. IRG, § 49(5) and 71(2).
81. Turkey: Law No. 3002 of May 8, 1984, Articles 3(l) and 11(1).
82. Information provided by Mr. G.J.0. Phillpotts, Home Office, Criminal Policy
Department.
83. Sharon Williams, Canadian Criminal Law: International and Transnational Aspects
459 (1981).
84. Nazarevich, supra note 15, at 232.
8LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
It goes without saying that such a designated officer should be
present at the verification proceedings carried out in that country if
such procedure is intended to suffice as an attestation of the voluntariness
of the offender's consent for Canadian purposes. Under the adminis-
trative arrangements concluded with several Western European countries
to the 1983 Council of Europe Convention, the Correctional Service of
Canada shall ensure that the foreign offender's consent is given vol-
untarily and with full knowledge of the consequences thereof (Article
3(8)). To that end, the applicant is asked to complete the prescribed
form 5 as appended to the arrangement, and have it witnessed by a duly
authorized officer. This measure does not in any way preclude a foreign
country from verifying in its own manner the prisoner's consent.
The offender's consent must not be left to an administrative organ
to be verified upon his discretionary request. The proof of consent by
its very nature should be required automatically or else its verification
may be overlooked or waived at the discretion of the designated au-
thorities. Thus, the legislation must prevent the authorities' arbitrariness
and susceptibility to abuse or corruption.
Consent is meaningless unless its verification by a judicial hearing
is automatic. Verification upon the prisoner's request, in this context,
bearing in mind the reach of his vulnerability to coercion, also would
be inadequate. Finally, without a verification hearing before transfer,
there is no sufficient basis for review of this aspect of the transfer
process upon habeas corpus application to a court in the enforcing state
where such a verification is not authorized or required by implementing
legislation.
Given these considerations and the competing considerations facing
an offender in the determination of whether to grant consent to transfer
under the treaty and the necessity that any such consent meet consti-
85. See Annex "C": Verification of Consent to Transfer to (foreign country):
I, (name of applicant) being a person under sentence desirous of returning
to (foreign country) to serve the remainder of my sentence certify that:
1. I have been advised in writing, of the legal consequences of a transfer
to (foreign country); and
2. I understand and agree with the said consequences, namely that upon
transfer, the completion of my sentence will be carried out in accordance with
the laws and procedures of (foreign country).
I further certify that my consent to transfer is wholly voluntary and not the
result of any promises, threats, coercion or other improper inducements.
I hereby consent to my transfer to (foreign country) to serve the remainder
of my sentence.
Signature of Transfer Applicant
Signature of Witness
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tutional standards for voluntariness, the United States Congress, in the
treaty's implementing legislation, provided an intricate mechanism for
the verification of an offender's consent to transfer.8 6 The purpose of
this procedure is to ensure that offenders are acquainted with the basic
provisions of the treaty and do not consent on the basis of immediate
pressures.
To minimize the litigation problems which may arise, it has been
deemed desirable for the United States to verify the consent in each
case and to have the verification procedure included in the implementing
legislation.8 7 The verification proceedings require that the offender per-
sonally appear before the verifying officer in the country in which the
sentence was imposed. In cases of outward transfers, the verifying officer
must be a United States magistrate or a judge of the United States as
defined in Section 451 of Title 28, United States Code,"' whereas the
consent given by an American in the sentencing state shall be verified
by a United States magistrate, or by a citizen specifically designated by
a judge of the United States. 9
Some concerns were expressed, however, whether the statute satis-
factorily accomplishes its purposes. 9° The brutal treatment, lack of nour-
ishment, and substandard medical care to which an offender could be
exposed were he or she not to transfer in a foreign prison may by
themselves constitute "threats, or other improper inducements" within
the meaning of the statute.9' Moreover, there is no provision in the
enabling legislation for the offender to be advised of the applicable
parole statutes. 92 Nor is information provided as to whether prosecution
for any other offenses, either state or federal, will occur on the offender's
return. Finally, no definite statement need be provided the offender
concerning educational, vocational, or other rehabilitative plans that may
be utilized. 9
F. Withdrawal of Consent
A prisoner's application can neither be seen as a "request,?' nor
can it be identified with his consent. The treaty regulation obligating
86. See Act of Oct. 28, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-144, codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 4101-
4115 (1985).
87. See H.R. Rep. No. 95-720, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N.
1977, 3160.
88. 18 U.S.C. § 4107(a) (1978).
89. 18 U.S.C. § 4108(a) (1978).
90. Abramovsky & Eagle, supra note 26, at 299.
91. 18 U.S.C. § 4108(d) (1978).
92. It should be noted, however, that information on the operation of the United
States parole laws is routinely contained in Part II of the booklet prepared by the
Department of Justice.
93. Questions and answers concerning the operation and the rules and regulations of
the United States federal prison system constitute Part III of the United States booklet.
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an offender to submit an application to get his transfer commenced
concerns technical and procedural matters and does not interfere with
fundamental conditions for transfer. There are no convincing grounds
to hold that, since the offender must apply for his transfer, as is required
under the American-Canadian treaty (Article 111(3)), his consent is im-
plicitly set up in the treaty. 94 The fact that a prisoner expressed his
interest in being transferred cannot be considered proof that he gave
his consent. It should be borne in mind that under some treaties, such
as, for instance, the Berlin Convention, an offender is allowed to apply
to either state, even though his consent is not a condition for transfer.
The initial application that an inmate submits before he is trans-
ferred, whether it is required or not, is not binding on him as a formal
consent to his transfer. The question then arises whether the prisoner's
consent may be withdrawn, and if so, until when. As it is the sentenced
person who should benefit from the transfer and because this form of
international cooperation in criminal matters is intended to serve pri-
marily humanitarian and rehabilitative purposes, the prisoner should
remain the ultimate judge in the matters concerning transfer until he is
effectively delivered to the authorities of the enforcing state. However,
for administrative reasons, it might be conceivable to put some limitations
on the prisoner's right to withdraw his consent, such as only until the
time that escort personnel have actually been dispatched to effect the
transfer.
Since international treaties and conventions do not address this issue,
an answer can be found in domestic legislation. Typically, where there
is provision for the verification of consent, the only consent which is
binding on the transferring offender is the consent which he must give
at a formal verification proceeding held before the competent authorities
of the sentencing and/or enforcing states just before the actual transfer
takes place. 9 Under the United States legislation, whether the offender
is transferring into or out of that country, 96 the consent given at such
proceedings is irrevocable as between the United States and the particular
offender involved. Although the Canadian Transfer of Offenders Act
94. Williams, supra note 83, at 447: "This condition [the offenders's consent] is
implicit in the American treaty since the offender must apply for his transfer." Id. It
seems, however, that this conclusion-that the requirement of the prisoner's consent which
is not explicitly specified in the United States-Canadian treaty-could and should be drawn
from Article III(10) (verification of consent) rather than from Article 111(3) (initiation of
transfer).
95. United States booklets anticipate that the actual transfer will take place within
one week of the holding of verification proceedings. See, e.g., United States Department
of Justice: Information Booklet for United States Citizens Incarcerated in Canadian
Prisons, at 17, Q. 63.
96. 18 U.S.C. §§ 4107(b) and 4108(b) (1978).
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does not contain any provision to that effect, Canada recognizes that
a Canadian offender transferring home may withdraw his consent so
long as the withdrawal is effected before his request and consent are
verified at the transfer location. 97
The English Repatriation of Prisoners Act 1984 provides that a
consent given by an offender may not be withdrawn after a warrant
has been issued in respect of the prisoner (Section 1(6)); and, accordingly,
a purported withdrawal of that consent after that time shall not affect
the validity of the warrant. If the prisoner were to withdraw his consent
before the issuance of the Secretary of State's warrant, as a matter of
law, the warrant would already be invalid, because one of the require-
ments for the issuance of the warrant would not have been met. Even
if notification of withdrawal of consent reached the Secretary of State
several days after the issuance of the warrant, this would not affect the
position in law, and the warrant would still be invalid. The same solution
was adopted by Cyprus in its implementing legislation to the 1983 Council
of Europe Convention.9"
Of the three comprehensive laws on international (legal) assistance
in criminal matters, only the German IRG explicitly provides that once
the prisoner, after being advised, consented to the transfer and his
statement to that effect has been inserted into the court records, or he
consented to it before the competent consular officer, his consent cannot
be withdrawn (Section 49(2)).
Absent an explicit legislative regulation in some countries, the with-
drawal of consent is a matter of internal policy and practice in each
of them. Given the various approaches manifested among member states
of the Council of Europe," a prisoner may validly revoke his consent
until an order to transfer is issued (Austria, Spain, and Switzerland);
until the movement of the actual transfer (Denmark, France, Luxem-
bourg, and Turkey); until the competent authorities of both sentencing
and enforcing states undertake "practical measures" for the transfer
(Finland); until it is given before a competent authority (Greece and
97. Canadian Booklet, Pt. II, Q. 13. Under administrative arrangements, a transfer
shall be cancelled if, inter alia, at any time prior to verification of consent, a transfer
applicant withdraws his/her application in writing, Articles 3(11) and 4(11).
98. See the Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons (Ratification) Law,
§ 3(2) (1986).
99. The following paragraph is based on replies to a questionnaire on the imple-
mentation of the 1983 Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons from member
states of the Council of Europe, signatories to this Convention. The questionnaire was
prepared and sent out by the European Committee on Crime Problems in 1988. Information
provided by the Directorate of Legal Affairs, Council of Europe, Strasbourg.
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The Netherlands); 10 or as long as the prisoner is still in the territory
of the sentencing state (Sweden).
IV. PROCEDURE OF TRANSFER
Due to the growing tendency within the international community
towards the ratification of existing multilateral instruments of prisoner
transfer and the conclusion of new bilateral treaties to that effect, on
the one hand, and the dissemination of information on this form of
international cooperation in criminal matters, on the other, foreign pri-
soners have become increasingly aware of the possibility of serving their
terms in their home countries. In the majority of cases, the very stimulus
for the formal initiation of transfer will be an application of the sen-
tenced person to either state. However, as the international public law
does not obligate a state to comply with the inmate's wish to be
transferred, any such initiative of the prisoner must be considered under
the addressed state's domestic legislation and not at the international
level. Nevertheless, a transferee should be regarded as a subject, not as
an object of the transfer proceedings. Any resemblance to the "surrender
of objects" within the meaning of extradition or judicial assistance must
be avoided.
In particular, the sentenced person who has expressed an interest
in being transferred, should be kept informed, in writing, of the follow-
up action in his case. He must, for instance, be told whether the necessary
information has been sent by the sentencing state to his home country,
whether a request for transfer has been made and by which state, and
whether a decision has been made on the request. Regrettably, only two
multilateral instruments, i.e., the 1983 Council of Europe Convention
(Article 4(5)) and the 1986 Commonwealth Scheme (Section 9), require
that the convicted offender be informed, in writing, of any action taken
by the sentencing country or the enforcing country on a request for his
transfer. Surprisingly enough, only three bilateral treaties, and no do-
mestic legislation, contain provisions to that effect. 10
Even in the "best case scenario," where an inmate applies directly
to the sentencing state which, without consulting the prisoner's home
country, submits the formal request to that state, it cannot be denied
100. If a prisoner has not been transferred from the Netherlands to a foreign country
within four months of giving his consent, he is entitled to make a new statement to the
effect that he may withdraw his previous consent and decide to serve his sentence in a
Dutch prison.
101. See the Hungarian-Portuguese treaty-Article 4(5); the Spanish-Argentinian treaty-
Article 8; and the Spanish-Mexican treaty-Article 9. It is noteworthy that the Spanish
treaties obligate the consular and diplomatic officials of the prisoner's home country to
provide him with the respective information. Id.
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that transfer of prisoners is a lengthy procedure. However, instead of
warning the potential transferees not to be "overly optimistic,"' 102 both
states involved should make every effort to speed up the transfer pro-
ceedings and to ensure that this procedure is carried out in a swift and
efficient manner. Considering that such a goal can best be accomplished
by facilitating and expediting the processing of transfer requests and
the subsequent transfer of applicants, Canada has developed a set of
procedural arrangements complementary to the 1983 Council of Europe
Convention. 103 The Convention imposes an obligation on the requested
state to inform promptly the requesting state of its decision whether it
agrees to the requested transfer (Article 5(4)). The majority of other
international instruments contain similar provisions. 104 It does not seem
appropriate, however, to specify any time limit for such action. 05
The question arises as to whether it is desirable to have the decision
to refuse transfer and to enforce a foreign sentence challenged in the
receiving state. It is noteworthy that two different systems developed in
the practical application of the prisoner transfer scheme. In one of them,
no appeal procedure is laid down either against a refusal by the com-
petent authority to consent to a transfer in or out, or against a prisoner's
continued detention in the enforcing state after he has been transferred
there. Such a solution is expressly adopted in the Repatriation of Pri-
soner's Act 1984, Section 3(6), which is peppered with discretionary
powers vested in the Secretary of State, dependent on his being satisfied
that a measure would be "appropriate," "inappropriate," "consistent,"
"unreasonable," or "reasonable." Although the Howard League for
Penal Reform considered that there should be an appeal to the courts
against administrative decisions and arrangements for the transfer, °0
both the Interdepartmental Working Party and the Parliament opposed
an idea of conferring any "rights of appeal" on a transferee.' °7
102. British citizens incarcerated abroad are advised not to expect a speedy transfer.
See the Home Office Guidance Leaflet, supra note 71, at 5, Q. 14: "The length of time
varies from case to case-there is no rule. Arrangements for transfer can sometimes be
a long process and might take up to 18 months in some cases." Id.
103. Information provided by the Directorate of Legal Affairs, Council of Europe,
Strasbourg.
104. See, e.g., the American-Turkish treaty-Article 17(1); the Canadian-Mexican treaty-
Article IV(4); the Spanish-Argentinian treaty-Article 6(2).
105. Canadian administrative arrangements are unique in requiring that transfer requests
normally be processed within three months from date of receipt, Article 2(3). However,
no sanction is provided for non-compliance with this provision. Interestingly enough, the
Soviet legislation stipulates an even shorter time limit of one month. See Decree of the
Supreme Council of the USSR, supra note 56, at § 6.
106. Prisoners in Foreign Jails, Howard League for Penal Reform, para. 2(V) (London
1979).
107. The Repatriation of Prisoners: Report of an Interdepartmental Working Party,
para. 42 (London 1980).
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The transfer is deemed to be a discretionary act, on the part of
both the sending and the receiving states, and it would be as well for
the enabling legislation to make the point clear: prisoners could neither
be liable to compulsory repatriation nor be endowed with a right of
repatriation. As between a prisoner in the United Kingdom seeking
repatriation and the prison authorities, repatriation would be analogous
to other discretionary acts of the authorities, such as transfer to another
prison or early release on parole. A refusal could be the subject of a
petition to the Secretary of State, could be challenged in Parliament or
might be grounds for an action in the civil courts or even an application
to the European Human Rights Commission.
The decision by virtue of which a foreign sentence is to be enforced
and an offender is to be incarcerated in the administering state should
be singled out and made the subject of a statutory right of appeal. A
judicial authority rather than an administrative one, entrusted with the
right to transform a foreign judgment along with the power to legitimize
the deprivation of liberty of an offender convicted abroad is more
appropriate to assure the convicted person that enforcement of the
sanction imposed on him and adaptation of the foreign sanction will
be carried out in accordance with the provisions of both a treaty or
Convention and domestic law.
It should be noted that the "right of appeal," although inherent
in the conversion of sentence procedure carried out by a judicial authority
in the enforcing state, is not limited to domestic legislation under which
a court is designated to take a decision on the execution of the sanction
imposed in a foreign country. 108 In Nordic countries, where the authority
to carry out enforcement proceedings is vested in administrative organs,
a transferee may appeal such decision in a court. 09 Notwithstanding the
fact that decisions in matters concerning enforcement of penal sentences
are subject to statutory conditions to a very limited extent, and con-
sequently the possibility to challenge such decisions is not likely to be
of any great practical importance, it was considered necessary to confer
the right of appeal, particularly in light of the Danish legislation pro-
108. Nearly all continental domestic legislations provide for an appeal against the
decision taken at the exequatur procedure. See, e.g., the Dutch Law of 1986, § 32; ARHG,
§ 67(1); IRSG, Article 106(3); the French Code of Criminal Procedure, Article 713-1 (as
amended by Law No. 84-1150 of Dec. 21, 1984); the Italian Code of Criminal Procedure
of 1989, Article 734(2); the Luxemburgian Law of July 31, 1987, Article 5; the Turkish
Law No. 3002, Article 7; the Polish Code of Criminal Procedure, Article 412.
109. See, e.g., the Norwegian Law of Nov. 15, 1963, § 15. The Swedish Law No.
193 of 1963 provides that an appeal against the decision taken by the general prison
administration may be brought before the King, Article 26.
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viding for the judicial control over administrative decisions involving
deprivation of liberty. 10
V. EXEQUATUR PROCEDURE
The exequatur is commonly perceived as a two-pronged analysis and
a procedure which serves two purposes:'" first, to examine conditions
of transfer and foreign judgment in view of its compatibility with the
domestic system of constitutional and criminal law as well as criminal
justice; second, to adapt the sanction imposed abroad. In some countries,
the latter process takes the form of the "conversion of sentence."
German commentators hold that, notwithstanding the intricate nature
of the exequatur procedure, both declaration of enforceability of a
foreign judgment and necessary transformation of a sanction are made
uno acto in these proceedings. ' 2 The exequatur decision is, therefore,
a unilateral and homogenous decision.
At the same time, it should not be ignored that the exequatur
proceedings are instituted also in order to give the convicted person the
assurance that enforcement of the sanction imposed upon him and
adaptation of the foreign sanction will be carried out in accordance
with the provisions of both international conventions and implementing
legislation. To that end, under legislation of several countries," 3 a court
is the only competent authority to deal with exequatur," 4 and the trans-
ferred person has the right to defense counsel, or if he cannot afford
one, to have counsel appointed by a court."5
Given the idea behind exequatur and the nature of exequatur pro-
cedure, the exequatur proceedings should be governed by some funda-
110. Denmark, Law No. 214 of 1963, § 19.
111. See, e.g., Hans Schultz, Les formes nouvelles de la collaboration des Etats dans
I'administration de la justice p6nale, in L'amelioration de la justice repressive par le droit
europ6en 102 (Vander ed. 1970); Jescheck, supra note 39, at 339; Walter Hasler, Die
Wirkung auslindischer Strafurteile im Inland 128 (1939); Ruth Esther Maag-Wydler, Die
Vollstreckung auslindischer Straferkenntnisse im Inland 130 (1978).
112. For the opinion of drafters of the German IRG, see Begruindung des Entwurfs
eines Gesetze uber die internationale Rechtshilfe in Strafsachen, BT-Drucks. 9/1338, 74.
See also Tho Vogler, in Gesetz uber die internationale Rechtshilfe in Strafsachen. Kom-
mentar, § 54, para. 2 (Vogler/Walter/Wilkitzki eds.) [hereinafter IRG-Kommentar].
113. See countries quoted supra note 108, and Italy, Code of Criminal Procedure,
Article 734.
114. The Interdepartmental Working Party opposed entrusting courts with authority
to carry out exequatur proceedings as it was considered to be "an unnecessary complication,
since the function is administrative rather than judicial." See The Repatriation of Prisoners,
supra note 107, at para. 47.
115. See, e.g., the Norwegian Law of Nov. 15, 1963, § 19; the Swedish Law No. 193
of 1963, Article 26; the Dutch Law of 1986, §§ 25 and 27; IRG, § 53.
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mental principles. These have developed in treaty practice and domestic
legislation and are independent from whether the enforcing state applies
the "continued enforcement" or "conversion of sentence" procedure.
(a) The examination of a foreign judgment must not lead to
the "revision au fond" and resentencing of the transferee in
any form.
(b) The exequatur authority shall be bound by the findings as
to the facts insofar as they appear explicitly or implicitly from
the judgment imposed in the sentencing state.
(c) The sanction stipulated in the exequatur decision should,
as far as possible, correspond with that imposed in a foreign
judgment.
(d) The penal position of the transferred offender must not be
aggravated.
(e) The competent authority of the enforcing state shall deduct
the full period of deprivation of liberty served by the transferred
offender in the sentencing state.
(f) The sanction determined in the exequatur decision must not
exceed the maximum prescribed by the law of the enforcing
state.
Examination of a foreign judgment should be confined to the pro-
cedural aspects; consequently there should be no "review of the mer-
its."" 6 Resentencing must be excluded notwithstanding the form it might
take, e.g., summary proceedings. The principle under (a) seems to be
so commonly accepted that it is universally and tacitly recognized. The
drafters of international conventions and treaties neglect including it in
the respective instruments. The principle derives from the need to respect
a foreign state's sovereignty and is rooted in the rule of equality of all
states."' The "revision au fond" would not only clearly contradict the
idea behind this form of international cooperation in criminal matters
but also might undesirably indicate a priority of the enforcing state's
jurisdictional power over that of the sentencing state.
There is a more pragmatic justification of this principle. It would
be difficult to provide the court responsible for resentencing with relevant
and adequate evidence to enable a valid sentencing decision to be made;
yet the fact of conviction alone would hardly be sufficient information
on which a court could determine sentence. Both the obtaining of the
necessary evidence and the process of resentencing itself would be a
time-consuming and expensive operation, and it is questionable whether
116. See Resolution IV(2) of the Ninth International Congress on Penal Law, supra
note 49, at 491.
117. Henry Donnedieu de Vabres, Les principes modernes du droit p~nal international
334 (1928).
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the resources of the enforcing state's criminal justice system should be
used for this purpose. In addition, the sending state might not be willing
to agree to repatriation if its sentence were subject, in effect, to review
by the receiving state. A further practical consideration is that if the
consent of the prisoner is required before transfer can take place, it
would hardly be reasonable to expect him to consent before he knows
what sentence he will be subject to; but it would be equally unreasonable
to spend time and effort in resentencing a prisoner who could then
refuse to be repatriated.
In some international instruments, it is expressly provided that the
competent authority of the administering state, while deciding on the
enforcement of a foreign sentence, shall be bound by the findings as
to the facts insofar as they appear explicitly or implicitly from the
judgment imposed in the sentencing state.'18 The reason for this condition
(principle (b) supra) is that the substitution by a sanction of a different
nature or duration does not imply any modification of the original
judgment; it merely serves to obtain an enforceable sentence in the
administering state.
Although one could concede that the judge or an administrative
organ of the enforcing country is authorized under the exequatur pro-
cedure to examine to a certain extent the content of the judgment with
regard to proof of the facts and to legal evaluation,1 9 it must not be
overlooked that the competent authority has no freedom to evaluate
differently the "factual" aspect on which the judgment of the sentencing
state is based. More difficult is the case of facts found by implication
in the judgment, for instance, the absence of justifying or exonerating
facts. Such findings bind the court or authority in the enforcing state
insofar as it can deduce them from the judgment. 20
If there is a difference between the legal systems to the effect that
a certain fact constitutes a legitimate defense in the enforcing but not
in the sentencing state, the enforcing state might feel compelled to refuse
enforcement if it finds that such a fact was present. Thus it may be
necessary for the court or authority in the enforcing state to conduct
a supplementary investigation into the facts, not determined by the
judgment of the sentencing state. Such an investigation may appear
necessary to make possible the legal evaluation and subsumption of the
118. See, e.g., the 1970 European Convention, Article 42; the 1983 Council of Europe
Convention, Article 11(1); and the Austrian treaties with Yugoslavia, Article 19(1), and
Hungary, Article 17(1).
119. See the opinions to that effect by Dietrich Oehler, Internationales Strafrecht,
Ko1n/Munchen 594 (1983), and Peter Wilkitzki, Der Regierungsentwurf eines Gesetzes
Ober die internationale Rechtshilfe in Strafsachen (IRG), Goltdamnmer's Archiv ffir Straf-
recht 376 (1981).
120. Explanatory Report on the 1970 European Convention, supra note 16, at 63.
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properly established facts in light of the domestic legislation of the
enforcing state.
However, the court of the enforcing state is not allowed to proceed
to the hearing of new evidence in respect of facts contained in the
judgment of the sentencing state. This need might arise if under the
law of the enforcing country certain facts must be examined which were
not relevant under the law of the enforcing state. It follows then, that
the court of the enforcing state cannot make any independent assessment
of evidence bearing upon the guilt of the person convicted and contained
in the judgment of the sentencing state.
Due to the principles mentioned above, such as those under (b) and
(e), the judge carrying out the exequatur proceedings is not acting like
a trial judge who hears the case and imposes a sanction. Nor is the
exequatur proceeding a regular criminal procedure. Part of the reasons
for shaping this procedure in such a specific way lies in the fact that
the competent authority of the enforcing state is bound by the prohibition
of reformatio in peius. Under the vast majority of treaties and con-
ventions,1 21 in determining the sanction, the court shall not aggravate
the penal situation of the sentenced person as it results from the judgment
pronounced in the sentencing state. 12 2 Some of them specifically stipulate
that no sentence of confinement shall be enforced by the administering
state in such a way as to extend its duration beyond the date at which
it would be terminated according to the sentence of the court of the
sentencing state. 23
The wording of the Austrian-Hungarian treaty is worth mentioning
in this context: "By the enforcement of the sentence in the administering
state, the prisoner's penal situation in its entirety must not be aggravated
compared to the situation as given in case of the further enforcement
in the sentencing state.' ' 24
The prohibition under principle (d) refers not only to prolongation
of incarceration, but also to application of a harsher kind of sanction
than that imposed by the sentencing state. If, for instance, under the
law of the enforcing state, the offense carries a more severe form of
deprivation of liberty than that specified in the judgment, e.g., penal
servitude or forced labour instead of (simple) imprisonment, the en-
forcing state is precluded from executing this harsher kind of sanction.'25
121. Exceptions are the Berlin Convention, the Arab Convention, the French treaties
with African countries (except Morocco and Djibouti), and the Polish treaties with de-
veloping countries.
122. See, e.g., the 1970 European Convention, Article 44(2); the 1983 Council of
Europe Convention, Article 11(l), and the 1986 Commonwealth Scheme, § 12(2).
123. See, e.g., the United States-Mexican treaty-Article 111(3).
124. See the Austrian-Hungarian treaty-Article 17(2).
125. See the Explanatory Report on the Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced
Persons, Council of Europe 26 (1983).
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Such aggravation would also occur if enforcement of part of a composite
sanction were to be deferred because there was no double criminality
in respect of part of the facts underlying the judgment whose enforcement
was requested, thus making enforcement by the administering state im-
possible. On the other hand, it would not be contrary to this principle
for an administrative authority to attach a disqualification or forfeiture
to the sanction, whether or not they are inflicted in the judgment to
be enforced.
VI. ENFORCEMENT OF THE SANCTION
All international instruments of prisoner transfer unanimously pro-
vide that the sentencing state alone shall have the right to decide on
the application for review of the judgment. This competence of the
sentencing state should not be interpreted as discharging the enforcing
state from the duty to enable the sentenced person to seek a review of
the judgment. Both states involved should take all appropriate steps to
guarantee the effective exercise of the convicted person's right to apply
for a review. It should be remembered, however, that the appeal pro-
ceedings may have an adverse bearing on the prisoner's interest and
right to a speedy transfer. They may cause a substantial delay of his
surrender as the vast majority of treaties and conventions specify that
transfer can only be effected if no appeal proceedings are pending in
the sentencing state.12 6
Although international agreements specifically prevent the prisoner's
use of an enforcing state's court to attack the sentence or conviction
rendered by a foreign court, this does not preclude a challenge in this
court that is not based on the foreign conviction or sentence. Therefore,
in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the prisoner transferred to
the United States may challenge the procedure utilized in his transfer
as not satisfying the statutory requirements and may challenge the con-
stitutionality of the respective treaty or its implementing legislation. 27
During the ratification hearings, it was pointed out that the legislative
history of the treaties and the implementing legislation showed Senate
concern for the quality of the foreign proceedings rendering the prisoner's
contentions groundless. 28 The Supreme Court's rulings to date have
substantiated this conviction.
The prisoner transfer scheme is based on a commonly accepted
understanding that once the convicted person is transferred, the admin-
126. See, e.g., the United States treaties with Mexico-Article 11(6); Peru-Article 11(3);
Bolivia-Article 111(5); Panama-Article 111(5); and Canada-Article 11(e).
127. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3244(5) (1979).
128. Hearings on Nine United States Treaties on Law Enforcement and Related Matters
Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1979).
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istering state, that is, the country of his residence or nationality, is
responsible for enforcement of the sentence underlying a transfer. It is
assumed that, through an international agreement, the sentencing state
expressly relinquishes its right of execution in its territory of a sanction
imposed by its court. As the receiving country assumes enforcement of
the judgment, execution of the sanction shall be governed by the pro-
visions which would have been applicable if the sanction had been
imposed in that state. 29 Signatories of all prisoner transfer instruments
have unanimously agreed that the enforcement shall be governed by the
law of the administering state, and that state alone shall be competent
to make all appropriate decisions.
The service of imprisonment in the home country, regardless of its
numerous advantages for the transferred prisoner, may result in an
aggravation of the penal situation of this person who, had the sanction
been enforced in the sentencing state, might have benefited not only
from pardon and amnesty, but possibly also from more favourable
provisions of the latter state governing, inter alia, conditional release
and parole. Therefore, it could be argued that any development in the
sentencing state favourable to the convicted person should have effect
also in the enforcing state. The principle of non-aggravation ° should
be applied not only in exequatur proceedings, but also in executing the
enforcement of a foreign judgment. A question arises as to whether
regulations concerning conditional release or parole in the sentencing
state which are more favourable for the transferred prisoner than the
provisions of the enforcing state should be taken into consideration. By
the same token, does the application of harsher conditions for parole
or for conditional release in the enforcing state violate this principle?
Neither the two basic considerations underlying the prisoner transfer
scheme, that is, humanitarian and rehabilitative ones, nor the main idea
behind this form of international cooperation in criminal matters, that
is, the enforcement of a foreign penal judgment, necessarily require that
the execution of the sanction be carried out in accordance with the
legislation of the sentencing state, or even that the law governing the
service of imprisonment of transferred offenders be a kind of mixture
of provisions from the sentencing and the administering states, whichever
are more favourable for him. It should be borne in mind that one of
the fundamental principles of the prisoner transfer scheme is that en-
forcement of the sentence is governed by the law of the administering
country.
In accordance with this rule, the Canadian Transfer of Offenders
Act explicitly provides that a Canadian offender transferred to Canada
129. A provision to that effect is adopted in the German IRG, § 57(5).
130. See text supra part V.
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becomes eligible for parole at a date determined by the National Parole
Board as being the date, so far as can be ascertained by the Board, at
which he would have been eligible for parole had he been convicted
and his sentence imposed by a court in Canada (Section 8).
It is not surprising, therefore, that, in 1988, the French Court of
Appeal in Paris refused to recognize the binding force of the decision
on conditional release made by the competent Swedish authority which
set out an earlier date of release than would be possible according to
French rules. 3 ' The court reasoned that the Swedish authorities alone
were bound by this decision and that the convicted person, by having
consented to his transfer, relinquished some benefits that he would have
enjoyed had he served his term in the sentencing state. The court did
not, however, make any inquiry into whether the prisoner was provided
with the relevant information and whether he was aware of the privileges
he would have to give up once he consented to transfer.
Nevertheless, some efforts are being made towards granting the
"most favoured clause" to the transferred offender. It is argued that,
since prisoner transfer is a form of "legal assistance," the most fa-
vourable provisions should be applied to the conditional release of the
transferee.'3 2 The Austrian ARHG expressly provides that, through the
enforcement of the sanction imposed in the sentencing state, the penal
situation of the prisoner must not be aggravated as compared with his
situation had he served his term in the sentencing state (Section 65(2)).
Along the line of the domestic legislation and the 1970 European Con-
vention, Austrian courts ruled that more favourable conditions in the
sentencing state for a conditional release should be taken into consid-
eration.' 33 It is noteworthy that provisions to this effect are adopted in
two Austrian treaties, 1' in the Portuguese-Hungarian treaty (Article 21(2)),
and in the verbal notes exchanged between Germany and Denmark.' 35
VII. EFFECTS OF TRANSFER
A. Protection Against Double Jeopardy
Notwithstanding numerous efforts by governments, supranational
bodies, and scholars aimed at universalization of the principle ne bis in
idem, there are still two dimensions of this maxim, domestic and in-
ternational, that do not coincide with each other. The scope of appli-
131. Cour d'Appel de Paris, judgment of Mar. 9, 1988, No. 8821/87 (unpublished).
132. See Vogler, supra note 112, at § 57, para. 15.
133. Epp, supra note 34, at 268.
134. See the Austrian treaties with Hungary-Article 17(2), and Poland-Article 15(2).
135. See the Danish verbal note of Aug. 19, 1983, and the German reply of Sept. 5,
1983, reprinted in IRG-Kommentar, supra note 112, at § 48, para. 11.
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cation of the ne bis in idem rule is generally limited to the state's
territory. The recurring question is whether and to what extent ne bis
in idem is a principle of international criminal law. 36 At the national
level, this maxim is considered one of the fundamental principles of the
domestic legal system. However, the ne bis in idem is not commonly
recognized at the international level for the res judicata rule is not
generally attached to a foreign penal judgment. It might be expected
that the new form of international cooperation in criminal matters, the
transfer of sentenced persons, would contribute to further development
and acceptance of this principle in interstate relations.
The ne bis in idem rule is one of the essential conditions of the
prisoner transfer scheme. It highlights the most important effect of a
transfer on the jurisdiction of the enforcing state: that the state shall
be bound by the conviction in the sentencing state and may not try the
transferred person again for the act for which the sentence underlying
the transfer was imposed. At the same time, this rule is in accord with
the basic perception of fairness which requires that an offender not be
put in jeopardy twice for the same offense (double jeopardy). Given
the constitutional safeguard underlying the ne bis in idem rule, prisoner
transfer instruments should expressis verbis provide the transferee with
the same protection against double jeopardy that he would have had if
he had been sentenced by a court of the jurisdiction seeking to prosecute
him.
This safeguard is of paramount importance where an offender is
not required to give his consent to a transfer and may, therefore, have
no say as to whether he is exposed to a risk of double jeopardy. Such
a guarantee should protect the transferred prisoner from both being
exposed to further prosecution and further punishment for the same
offense.'37
The need for the inclusion of the ne bis in idem principle can be
justified by the fact that the administering state assumes nothing but
enforcement of the sentence pronounced by a court of the other country,
while the judgment itself remains a foreign one. It follows logically that,
without a specific provision to that effect, no legal consequences can
be drawn from the judgment, as such consequences are normally at-
tributed exclusively to judgments delivered by domestic courts. These
effects include res judicata and double jeopardy.
Out of seven multilateral prisoner transfer instruments, four con-
ventions do not contain provisions to that effect. 3 It should be noted
136. Oehler, supra note 119, at 578.
137. See Resolution IliA of the Ninth International Congress on Penal Law held in
Hague in 1964, supra note 49.
138. The 1983 Council of Europe Convention, the 1983 Arab Convention, the 1968
Benelux Convention, and the 1986 Commonwealth Scheme.
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that under two of them, the Arab Convention and the Benelux Con-
vention, the prisoner's consent is not required. The 1983 Council of
Europe Convention merely specifies the effects of transfer for the sen-
tencing state. It provides that the taking into charge of the sentenced
person by the authorities of the enforcing state shall have the effect of
suspending the enforcement of the sentencing state (Article 8). A similar
provision is included in the 1986 Commonwealth Scheme (Section 10).
The protection against double jeopardy is provided by the Berlin
Convention (Article 3)139 and the Nordic legislation. 140 Under the 1970
European Convention, the criminal judgment has the effect of ne bis
in idem in relation to other signatory states in the event of an acquittal
or a conviction where the sanction imposed was enforced in the normal
manner, or of the court that convicted the offender where no sanction
was imposed (Article 53(1)). However, the Convention placed two res-
trictions on this principle. First, the criminal judgment never has the
effect of ne bis in idem in relation to the state in which the offense
was committed (Article 53(3)). Moreover, a signatory state is not obliged
to recognize this effect if the act which gave rise to the judgment was
directed against either a person or an institution or any other thing
having public status in that state, or if the offender himself had a public
status in that state (Article 53(2)).
It is noteworthy that out of all bilateral treaties under review, only
thirteen expressly provide for the protection to the transferred offender
against double jeopardy. Again, out of sixteen agreements concluded by
France with African countries, only one, that with Cameroon (Article
28), contains specific provision to that effect. Interestingly enough, the
only European treaties which have provisions concerning ne bis in idem
are those concluded with non-European countries,'14 1 while the agreements
signed within Europe, such as those between Eastern European and
Western countries, do not address this issue.
It is noteworthy that the Austrian-Yugoslav treaty (Article 9(3)) and
Hungarian treaties, 42 while directly stipulating the ne bis in iden rule,
139. Under the Berlin Convention, the transferred offender may be prosecuted in the
enforcing state if a sentencing state's court set aside the judgment and re-trial is ordered,
provided, however, that the competent authorities of the sentencing state requested the
enforcing state to institute criminal proceedings, Article 15.
140. See, e.g., the Danish Law No. 214 of 1963, § 21, and the Swedish Law No. 193
of 1963, § 29.
141. See the Greek-Egyptian treaty-Article 15, and the Spanish treaties with Ar-
gentina-Article 13(1); Peru-Article 7, and Mexico-Article 18. It should be noted,
however, that neither the treaties with Thailand nor those with the United States and
Canada mention the ne bis in idem rule. The Polish treaties with developing countries
also belong to this group.
142. See the Hungarian treaties with Austria-Article 19(5); Portugal-Article 28;
Spain-Article 19(5); and Turkey-Article 17(5).
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provide that if at the time of transfer the criminal proceedings for the
same offense are pending against the prisoner in the enforcing state,
the criminal proceedings shall be temporarily discontinued (suspended).
The competence of that state to prosecute the transferee is terminated
when the sanction imposed has been fully enforced or when the offender
has been pardoned.
Under the United States-Canada treaty (Article VI) and Mexican
treaties with the United States (Article VII) and Canada (Article VII),
prosecution for the same offense is barred in the enforcing state. In
addition, that state may not prosecute offenses in which the prosecution
would have been barred if the sentence had been imposed by one of
its courts, federal or state. Under the treaties concluded by the United
States 43 and Canada" with some Latin American countries, the en-
forcing state is prohibited from detaining, trying, or sentencing a trans-
ferred offender for the same offense for which the sentence was imposed
by the transferring state.
The French treaties with the United States (Article 5(b) and (c)) and
Canada (Article V (a) and (b)) provide that a transfer may be refused
if the facts upon which the conviction is based have resulted in pro-
ceedings in the enforcing state or if the enforcing state has decided to
abandon or not to initiate proceedings based on the same facts.
There is a group of agreements in which the ne bis in idem rule
is considered, not in terms of the effect the transfer has for the enforcing
state, but rather in the context of refusal of transfer. Accordingly, a
transfer may 45 or must 46 be refused if the offender has been convicted
and sentenced for the same offense in the enforcing state.
Not only international treaty or convention, but also domestic law
of the enforcing country, may grant protection against double jeopardy
to the transferred prisoner. The United States' legislation, for instance,
prohibits detention, prosecution, trial, or sentence of a transferred of-
fender by the United States or any state thereof in two instances: if
such action would be barred, when the sentence upon which the transfer
was based had been issued by a court of the jurisdiction seeking to
prosecute the transferred offender; or if prosecution would have been
barred by the laws of the jurisdiction seeking to prosecute the transferred
offender, when the sentence had been issued by a court of the United
143. See the United States treaties with Panama-Article VI(l), Bolivia-Article VI(l),
and Peru-Article VI(l).
144. See the Canadian treaties with Bolivia-Article VI(l), and Peru-Article VI(I).
145. See the United States-Turkish treaty-Article V(j).
146. See the Turkish treaties with Yugoslavia-Article 6(6), and Hungary-Article 9;
the Hungarian-Portuguese treaty-Article 12(l); and the 1968 Benelux Convention-Article
5(2).
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States or another state. 47 Provisions to that effect are adopted in the
domestic law of several other countries. 41 In Germany, it is pointed out
that, in the case of inward transfers, the effect of ne bis in idem should
be attributed to a foreign judgment from the moment when the com-
petent authority makes a decision to agree to the requested transfer and
not when the exequatur decision is delivered or execution of the sanction
begins. 49
B. Rule of Speciality
1. Possible Retention of Speciality From the Framework of
Extradition
Since the prisoner transfer scheme attempts to create no added
advantages or disadvantages for the transferred person as a result of
his transfer, it may be argued that speciality should be carried forward
from the experience of extradition. Consider, hypothetically, state A's
citizen who is imprisoned in state B for an ordinary crime. Assume that
the prisoner is also being sought by state A's authorities for a political
crime committed in the territory of or against that state. In the absence
of prisoner transfer, state A could not obtain control over the offender.
Even if states A and B have an extradition agreement, it is very likely
that the latter state would not extradite the prisoner, even at the con-
clusion of his sentence, because of the political offense exception. If
the prisoner transfer scheme is simply intended to mitigate the harshness
of being imprisoned in a foreign country, the prisoner should be able
to serve out his sentence in his home country (state A), and then be
free to return to state B or to move to any other country as he would
have been in the absence of transfer.
This raises the question whether there are compelling reasons for
retention of the rule of speciality in the prisoner transfer scheme. The
provision imposing the limitation upon the requesting state to the effect
that this state cannot prosecute the offender for any offense other than
for which the accused was surrendered is commonly adopted in the
framework of extradition.
While considering his consent to transfer, the offender is likely to
conclude that there are more compelling and important reasons for
serving his sentence in his home country, thereby avoiding hardships
147. 18 U.S.C. § 4111 (1978).
148. See, e.g., Austria-ARHG, § 67(3); France-Code of Criminal Procedure, Article
713-8; Italy-Code of Criminal Procedure, Article 739; Luxembourg-Law of July 31,
1987 (Memorial of Aug. 26, 1987), Article 8; Germany-IRG, § 56(3); Switzerland-IRSG,
Article 98.
149. Vogler, supra note 112, at § 56, para. 3.
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and substandard conditions of prisons in the sentencing state, than for
avoiding other charges in the enforcing state that he would have to
face, in any event, should he return home. The humanitarian and
rehabilitative premises upon which the prisoner transfer scheme is based
may prevail over considerations underlying the rule of speciality. It
should be also kept in mind that, to the extent that the prisoner's
transfer to his home country will permit a pending warrant for his arrest
to be disposed of at an earlier date, it may be advantageous for him
to transfer. If he is convicted of the charges pending against him in
the enforcing state, there may be a possibility that his sentence for those
charges may be made to run concurrently with the remainder of his
foreign sentence.
As long as the decision to extradite lies entirely in the hands of the
requested state, the rule of speciality seems to have firm and unques-
tionable grounds. The attitude towards this principle changes, however,
when the wanted offender can have a bearing on the decision concerning
the extradition request by consenting to his surrender in a simplified
manner. Although no convincing evidence has been produced to justify
the relinquishment of the speciality protection in such a case, there is
a temptation to apply the same analysis in the context of prisoner
transfer to the extent that the transferee be deprived of this protection.
It could be argued that the duty to protect the extradited person
from prosecution on other counts arises in circumstances entirely dif-
ferent from those in prisoner transfer. While the person being extradited
is travelling under duress, the person being transferred is doing so
voluntarily and, in the vast majority of cases, at his own request. Such
contrasting of the legal position of the extraditee with that of the
transferee inevitably leads to the conclusion that the protection under
the speciality rule need not be granted to the latter. The choice that
the convicted person faces is either to consent to transfer to his home
country where he may be prosecuted and punished for other offenses
as well as extradited to a third state or to waive the benefits of serving
his term at home in exchange for avoiding further charges in the en-
forcing state.
Such a system is commonly adopted in international instruments of
prisoner transfer. On the .one hand, multilateral conventions, such as
the 1983 Council of Europe Convention and the 1986 Commonwealth
Scheme, and bilateral treaties, such as all French, Thai, and Canadian
treaties, as well as all but one United States treaty, which make transfer
dependent on the prisoner's consent, do not adhere to the doctrine of
speciality. On the other hand, where the prisoner's consent is not re-
quired, such as under the Nordic legislation150 and the 1970 European
150. See, e.g., the Danish Law No. 214 of 1963, § 6, and the Norwegian Law of
Nov. 15, 1963, § 6.
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Convention (Article 9), he is protected against prosecution and punish-
ment in the enforcing state for an offense other than that specified in
the request for transfer (or enforcement). The commentators on the
latter convention make it clear that, since this instrument is based on
the principle that enforcement of a foreign judgment does not presuppose
the offender's prior consent, it was necessary to provide for the rule
of speciality.'
There is, however, a group of treaties which reject the "either
(consent)-or (speciality)" concept and manifest that it is neither necessary
nor inevitable to follow such a pattern. All but one bilateral treaty
between Eastern European and Western countries, 15 2 as well as the United
States-Turkish treaty (Article VI) and the Spanish-Argentinean treaty
(Article 13(2)), require the prisoner's consent as a precondition for
transfer and grant the transferred offender protection under the rule of
speciality. It is noteworthy that the United States-Turkish treaty, modeled
after the 1970 European Convention, provides for an additional safe-
guard to the transferred prisoner. Pursuant to Article VI(l)(b), the
sentencing state shall not grant its consent to prosecute the sentenced
person for crimes committed prior to transfer if the enforcing state
considers such offense to be of a political nature or connected with
such an offense or a purely military one.
2. Proposed Solution
The prevailing approach to the rule of speciality, as manifested in
prisoner transfer instruments, both international and domestic, is based
on an assumption that since the offender is the intended beneficiary in
the prisoner transfer scheme, and while extradition is detrimental to the
interests of the person concerned, the prisoner's consent automatically
excludes speciality. If this concept were adopted, notwithstanding some
shortcomings of such a reasoning, it would follow that the rule of
speciality must be applied as long as the prisoner's consent is not
required. It is, therefore, unacceptable that none of these safeguards be
granted to the transferred offender.
A group of international agreements which produces such an anomaly
consists of the 1983 Arab Convention, the 1968 Benelux Convention,
the 1978 Berlin Convention, the Polish bilateral treaties with developing
151. Explanatory Report on the 1970 European Convention, supra note 16, at 39.
152. See the Austrian treaties with Poland-Article 22, Hungary-Article 23, and
Yugoslavia-Article 27, the Turkish treaties with Hungary-Article 21, and Yugoslavia-
Article 18; and the Hungarian treaties with Spain-Article 23, and Portugal-Article 30.
The only exception is the treaty between Poland and Turkey. Evidently, the repugnance
of Polish negotiators to the rule of speciality in the prisoner transfer scheme prevailed
and was subsequently manifested in treaties with developing countries.
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countries, and the ten French agreements with African countries con-
cluded between 1961 and January 1974. They permit an offender to be
transferred without his consent, and even against his will, while at the
same time, not protecting the offender under the rule of speciality.
This issue is very rarely addressed by domestic legislation. It is
noteworthy that the Swi's IRSG distinguishes, as far as inward transfers
are concerned, Swiss citizens from other offenders. Only the latter shall
not be prosecuted, punished, or extradited to a third state by Swiss
authorities for offenses committed before their surrender (Article 99(3)).
To retain the rule of speciality where the prisoner's consent is not
required is merely a program minimum. The fundamental notion of
fairness requires a further step. As it is commonly accepted that the
prisoner is the ultimate judge in matters concerning his transfer, it follows
that before he can make up his mind, he must be sure that he understands
the possibility of further charges when and if he is brought home.
Moreover, he must know what the charges are so that he may intelligently
decide whether to come back and face them rather than stay where he
is, where the charges cannot be brought against him. It is both insuf-
ficient and unfair to leave gathering the relevant information to the
sentenced person, and to impute to the prisoner that "he himself should
be well aware of any charges that could be brought against him for
any past activities in the enforcing state."' 53 Rather, the competent
authorities of the prisoner's home country should disclose all outstanding
charges against the convicted person to the effect that they would be
competent to prosecute and punish him for the offenses disclosed. At
the same time, the rule of speciality should apply with respect to all
other charges of which the prisoner was unaware while consenting to
transfer.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
The following safeguards should be granted to the person convicted
and incarcerated in a foreign state who is being transferred under the
prisoner transfer scheme to his home country to serve his sentence there:
(1) the right to be informed of the possibility of transfer to
his home country under an international treaty or domestic
legislation of both states involved;
(2) the right to express to either state his interest in being
transferred;
(3) the right to be provided with advice and information con-
cerning the substance, procedure, and consequences of his trans-
fer, in a language he understands;
153. House of Lords, Hansard, Mar. 5, 1984, col. 48 (Lord Elton).
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(4) the right to consent to his transfer;
(5) the right to be informed, in writing, of any action and any
decision taken by either state on a request for his transfer;
(6) the right to be surrendered to the competent authorities of
the enforcing state without an unreasonable delay (the right to
a speedy transfer);
(7) the right to be assisted by counsel in the verification of
consent proceedings and exequatur procedure;
(8) the right to challenge the exequatur decision in a court of
the enforcing state;
(9) the protection against an aggravation of the penal position
in the exequatur procedure and the execution of enforcement;
(10) the protection against double jeopardy in the enforcing
state;
(11) the protection deriving from the rule of speciality insofar
as the prisoner's consent is not required, and he is not informed
of the outstanding charges against him in the enforcing state
before transfer takes place.

